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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this work is to examine the relationship between Iran and Israel
after Israel became a state in 1948 following the United Nations (UN) Partition Plan for
Palestine in 1947, which would lead to independent Arab and Jewish states. The
Palestinians and their Arab neighbors rejected the UN Partition Plan and attacked Israel
but were defeated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Israel and Iran (not an Arab
country) quickly became best friends and trading partners, since their Arab neighbors
were hostile to both countries. This new partnership included a joint pipeline to transport
oil across Israel and the sharing of Israel missile technology with Iran.
Additionally, this research explores how the United States (US) became part of
the Israeli-Iranian alliance after the British decided to withdraw their military forces from
the Gulf in the late 1960s. President Richard Nixon proclaimed his Twin Pillar Policy of
handing over security of the Persian Gulf to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both countries,
especially Iran, were heavily armed by the United States. Iran’s close ally Israel
subsequently also received billions of dollars in arms from the United States, becoming
part of the bulwark intended to prevent the Soviets from increasing their influence in the
Middle East.
The triple alliance collapsed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran when the
US hostage crisis compelled the United States to disengage. The hostage issue turned the
United States against Iran; consequently the United States has rejected numerous
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overtures by Iran to improve relations over the last 30 years. The Islamic Revolution also
ended the robust alliance between Iran and Israel. However, during its war with Iraq
(1980-1988), Israel continued to sell arms to Iran in exchange for oil, hoping Iran would
become more secular and the alliance could be reestablished. The United States illegally
sold arms to Iran as well, leading to the Iran-Contra scandal.
Many Arab states assisted the United States and Western allies in defeating Iraq
in the first Gulf War. This was followed by the Oslo Accords prompting a possibility of
peace between Israel and the Palestinians. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
and the possibility of peace with the Palestinians, Israel perceived it was no longer a
strategic asset to the United States and would lose vital financial and political support
from its major benefactor. To ensure that the crucial support from the United States
would continue, Israel turned on Iran, painting it as irrational and therefore the new
existential enemy of both Israel and the United States, if it were to develop a nuclear
weapon. At the same time, the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) carried the same message to the US Congress and Administration.
Israel continues to exist, to a large extent because of US aid assured by the proIsrael lobby in the US.
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INTRODUCTION
As this thesis is being written, Israel and Iran appear to be on the verge of a
military confrontation leading to another war in the Middle East that will involve the
United States (US). It doesn’t have to be this way: Israel, Iran, and the United States were
fated to be allies. Historically the Persians rescued the Jews (who had been enslaved by
the Babylonians) and later hosted the largest Jewish population in the Middle East during
the diaspora. The United States tried to assist Iran in developing democratic institutions
in the early part of the twentieth century and also allied with Iran during the reign of
Mohammad Reza Shah. Israel supplied Iran with technology and weapons, including
missiles; this continued even after the Iranians were attacked by Iraq, while at the same
time the Ayatollah Khomeini was calling for Israel’s destruction and the rest of the world
supported Iraq.
Israel and Iran developed a mutually beneficial alliance after Israel declared itself
independent in Palestine in 1948. Israel was immediately attacked by most of its Arab
neighbors who were adamantly opposed to the United Nations (UN) partition of Palestine
and the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel. Israel was able to defeat the
dysfunctional Arab armies who were poorly trained and poorly equipped. The Israeli
victory nearly doubled the size of land given to the Zionists by the UN; a humiliating
defeat for the Arabs.

2
To survive, Israel needed oil that the Arab states refused to sell to them. Both
Israel and Iran wanted arms from the United States and the West. Israel engaged in
seeking friends and trading partners from the Arab periphery—those neighbors who had
not joined with the Arabs to “wipe Israel off the map.” Iran had oil and was using oil
revenues to continue the modernization started by Shah Reza Pahlavi who had ruled Iran
from 1921-1944. Oil had been discovered in Iran by the British in 1908 and was extracted
in large quantities to fuel the British fleet during the Great War and into World War II.
Iran received little compensation for their valuable resource. Iran’s challenge to this
exploitation led to Iran being partitioned for a second time by Britain and Russia (Soviet
Union) during World War II. Iran was devastated and humiliated again by a US-led CIA
coup in 1953, just as it was again attempting democratic rule. Israel became Iran’s closest
ally.
In return for selling oil to Israel, Iran received military and technical assistance
from Israel as they attempted to rebuild their shattered economy. This alliance included a
joint partnership to build a pipeline for shipping Iranian oil across Israel to the
Mediterranean, at the same time avoiding the volatile Suez Canal. The pipeline also
supplied Iranian oil to Israel. Later Israel assisted Iran in building ballistic missiles, in
addition to providing conventional arms and trade. Both countries became allied with the
United States to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. The alliance between
Israel, Iran, and the US lasted until Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was toppled during
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Israel-Iran alliance was re-kindled when a weakened
Iran needed military assistance including US spare parts after being attacked by Iraq in
1980. In his book Treacherous Alliance, the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the U.S.,
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Trita Parsi argues that Israel always needed Iranian oil and was willing to export arms to
Iran and they both still needed the United States.1
After the humiliation of the 1979 hostage crisis in Tehran, the United States had
little interest in maintaining an alliance with Iran after the shah was deposed and the
Khomeini fundamentalists were brought into power. The United States did not want Iran
to win the Iran-Iraq war and actually supported Iraq, hoping both sides would be
weakened.2 In the late 1980s the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and was no
longer supporting Israel’s enemies: the Arab states. Iraq emerged from the exhaustive
war with Iran with a somewhat intact military. Still lusting for more oil, Iraq invaded
Kuwait in 1990; an Arab state attacking another Arab state. A US-led coalition, including
many Arab states, quickly defeated Iraq with some assistance from Iran. Also, in 1991
the Soviet Union, the common enemy of Israel, Iran, and the United States, was gone.
Their other enemies, the Arabs, were more accommodating with some prospects for
peace with Israel.
Almost overnight the key players in the Middle East changed sides. The threat
from the Soviet Union was gone; Iraq was weakened and no longer a threat to its
neighbors. The Arab States were signaling acceptance of Israel and were acquiescing on
the Palestinian State issue. Israel and Iran were emerging as Middle East powerhouses as
Iran was aspiring for leadership of all Muslims. Israel contemplated expanding into the
West Bank as its economy and population grew.3 There were, however, obstacles
blocking these hegemonic aspirations.
Israel was beginning to sense loss of US backing, as it was no longer of strategic
value in blocking Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Israel had few other friends and
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so it deemed maintaining US support to be a critical strategy.4 Israel also feared Iran was
becoming the new uncontested Middle East powerhouse. It was time to take action.
Iran was ignored and humiliated by the West once more, following the Gulf War,
as they had not been included in either the Madrid or Oslo political processes that had
involved all their neighbors. This affront was undermining their quest for a leadership
role in regional politics, as they still sought what they envisioned as “great power” status,
a self-described “historic right” that had been pursued by the shah and continued by
Khomeini. Iran began to support opponents of Oslo, accusing the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Jordan of betraying their own people while characterizing the
Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount) as an insult to all
Muslims. Trita Parsi argues, “The cold peace that reigned between Israel and Iran turned
into a cold war almost overnight.” Israel’s former ally was now “fanatical and
irrational.”5
With the common enemies of Israel, Iran, and the United States no more, and
both Israel and Iran seeking regional hegemony, Israel began to unexpectedly portray
Iran as an existential threat, not only to Israel but to the whole Middle East and even the
United States. Convincing the United States to provide continued unwavering backing
would be a challenging task. Ensuring that support by painting Iran as the new common
threat would be left to the influential Israeli lobby in the United States: The American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL LINKS BETWEEN JEWS AND PERSIANS
A brief review of the early relations between the Persians and Jews will help us to
better understand their relations today. Both the Jewish and Persian people had a
significant presence in the Middle East long before the Arabs had any national coherence.
The religious beliefs and culture of the Persians and Jews have many commonalities and
interactions dating back over twenty-five centuries.
Thought to have originated in the Near East (Southwest Asia), the Jewish people
are Semitic and related to their Arab neighbors.1 Many Jews eventually settled in
Mesopotamia, then moved on to the land of Canaan, an area in the Fertile Crescent.2
Jewish history clearly defines their heritage as descending from the biblical patriarch
Abraham who was asked by God to leave his home in Ur and move to Canaan to
establish a new nation. This was Abraham’s “Covenant with God” centered on the land
of Israel.
The boundary of the land allegedly given to Abraham by God has always been
and still is controversial depending on descriptions in Genesis, Numbers, or Ezekiel, and
remains important today as many in Israel refer to those descriptions when claiming the
West Bank as their biblical right. The land description in Genesis was quite extensive and
rather vague while texts in Numbers and Ezekiel are more widely accepted by most
Israelis.
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Figure 1.1.

The boundaries of the Land of Israel defined by Numbers and
Ezekiel3

As Ofir Haivry argues in his essay “On Zion: Reality that Fashions Imagination,”
the Bible “unambiguously insists that the connection to the land is an a priori condition
for the fulfillment of the religious commandments. All of Jewish religious ritual is
intended for inhabitants of the land, and is possible only within its borders.”4 Jews point
to a passage in Ezekiel: “God will lift you out of your grave and sit you on your own
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land,” and “This land will be your inheritance.”5 The land dispute prevails today as Israel
continues to expand its borders.
Abraham had two sons: Ishmael whose mother was Abraham’s maidservant
Haagar, and Isaac with Abraham’s wife Sarah. Ishmael and Haagar left the clan, moving
to Arabia where Ishmael’s twelve sons built a “great nation,” according to Arab tradition.
Ishmael became Father of the Arabs and is recognized in the Quran as an important
prophet and an ancestor of Mohammad.6 Isaac is considered to be the Father of the Jews.
The Jews were eventually forced into slavery in Egypt. Later, around 1446 BCE,
the Jews were led from Egyptian slavery by the prophet Moses and settled into tribal
areas back in Canaan. Having also received the Ten Commandments from God, Moses is
regarded as the most important prophet in Jewish tradition.7 He also is believed to have
authored the Jewish book of Law and the Torah, the first books of the Jewish Bible.
Many consider the Bible to be the word of God. Many disagree.
Marcus Borg argues in his book Jesus: Uncovering the Life, Teachings, and
Relevance of a Religious Revolutionary that the Jewish Bible is “Israel’s story about
Israel, not God’s story about Israel. Like the Christian Bible it combines memory,
testimony and metaphor.” He goes on to argue that the Jewish Bible is the story of
Israel’s “engagement with history, empires, kingdoms, exodus from Egypt, exile in
Babylon” and other events.8
The Jews had united under the kings David and Solomon and built their first
temple in 957 BCE. That temple was totally destroyed in 586 BCE by the Babylonians
when they sacked the city. The Persians, led by Cyrus the Great, conquered Babylonia
where they encountered many slaves including exiled Jews taken when Babylonia
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previously conquered Judea. In 538 BCE, Cyrus allowed the Jews to return to Israel to
“build the temple of the Lord, the God of Israel, in Jerusalem” and is revered in Jewish
biblical history.9 The Jews appreciated the Persian king so much they elevated him to a
god-like status.10 Cyrus was the only non-Jew to achieve that standing in the Jewish
Bible.11 Many Jews returned home, although many went to Persia (Iran) where a large
Jewish community still exists. There are many Iranian Jews (over 200,000) who live in
Israel today.12
The 1878 discovery of the Cyrus Cylinder in Mesopotamia refers to Cyrus
liberating slaves from Babylonia but does not mention the Jews specifically. It seemed to
have been a bigger deal to the Jews than to the Persians.

Figure 1.2.

The Cyrus Cylinder.13 Photograph by Jona Lendering. Courtesy of
The British Museum.
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The Jews prospered until the Romans arrived, razing Jerusalem in 70 AD and
causing the Jews to flee to other countries in the Middle East, many to Persia. The Jews,
in diaspora, were generally unwilling to assimilate and usually resided in ghettos in the
various countries to which they fled. They maintained their culture by learning Jewish
history, laws, and customs because of ardent education from their rabbis, in spite of
repeated, often violent, oppression. After all, they were God’s “special” people and they
were determined to survive, as Jews.

Figure 1.3. 1910 photo of Jewish children in Samarkand with their Rabbi
(modern Uzbekistan).14 Photograph by Sergei Mikhailovich Prokidin-Gorskii.
Courtesy of Creative Commons.
Another historical tradition connecting the Jews, Persians, and then the early
Christians is the common belief in one god; most other cultures were polytheistic. The
Jews, as late as the tenth century BCE, had apparently not yet entirely embraced the
monotheism of Abraham, as Solomon was known to have had polytheistic beliefs.15
Scholars are still questioning why the monotheistic beliefs of Abraham were not fully
embraced by the Jews many generations after his death. Some scholars speculate that the

10
Jews, while in exile in Babylonia, were exposed to and came to embrace monotheism and
the human rights values of Zoroaster while interacting with the Persians after Cyrus
conquered Babylonia. Parsi argues that “It was under Persian influence that Judaism
became a monotheistic religion,” which might be why many Jews chose to live in Persia
during the diaspora.16
The early Persians had been exposed to the teachings of Zoroaster, a Persian
priest who lived between 1700 and 1400 BCE. Zoroastrianism eventually became the
state religion of the Persian Empire. As Mary Boyce argues in her book Zoroastrians,
Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, Zoroaster’s teaching seems to have influenced the
Jews, creating a bond with the Persians.17 Many practices from Zoroastrianism crept into
the Jewish tradition, including not only the belief in one god but the cosmic principles of
righteousness and truth.
Boyce argues that Zoroastrianism, therefore, may have been as great an influence
on the monotheistic beliefs of the Jews (subsequently Christians and Muslims) as was
Abraham.18 Beginning as a cult of light and fire, Zoroastrianism also embraced the ideas
of heaven and hell, the last judgment, resurrection, the afterlife, and five times daily
prayer.19 Iran’s major holiday is still Nowruz (the Zoroastrian New Year – celebrated for
over 3000 years).20 The Jewish New Year, Rosh Hashana, has similar origins. Nikki
Keddie states in her book Modern Iran, Roots and Results of Revolution that “Many
scholars agree Zoroastrianism influenced Judaism then Christianity and Islam.”21
The Islamic conquest of Persia by the Arabs in 651 CE led to the end of the
Persian Empire and the eventual decline of the Zoroastrian religion. The majority of
Iranians gradually converted to Islam. However, many of the achievements of the
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previous Persian civilizations were not lost but instead were absorbed by the new Islamic
culture.
Following Mohammad’s death, Islam spread quickly throughout the Middle East
and Northern Africa; Islamic civilization was far from unified. When the Arabs
conquered Persia in 643-651 AD, most Iranians initially converted to Sunni Islam but
later changed to mostly Shi’ite (Shia) during the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722).22
The Sunni-Shia chasm occurred following the death of the prophet when the
followers could not agree on who would follow Mohammad as the new caliph and Imam.
The Shia faction insisted only a direct descendant of Mohammad who was possessed
with “special spiritual qualities” was capable of “interpreting the truth.” The Sunni
faction became more secular. Therefore, as Vali Nasr argues in The Shia Revival, only
Ali, the prophet’s son-in-law and cousin, could lead after the death of the prophet.23 Ali
was assassinated as was Hosain, his son and Mohammad’s grandson, who followed Ali
as Imam. On his last trip to Mecca, the prophet had stated: “Hosain is of me and I am of
Hosain.”24
The martyrdom of Hosain remains as important an event in Shia Islam as Jesus
dying on the cross is to Christianity.25 The Shia direct line of succession continued until
the twelfth Imam, Muhammad Mahdi, who went into “occultation” in 939 CE. The Shia
await Mahdi’s return.
During the Safavid dynasty, Shia Islam became the state religion of Iran. The
Qajar dynasty replaced the Safavids and lasted until 1925. The Qajars were corrupt,
needed money, and sold concessions to Europeans. Eventually the Iranian people rose up,
wanting democratic rule, leading to the constitutional revolution of 1906-1911.

12
Continued corruption and exploitation by the West led to a coup d’etat in 1921 by a
strong Cossack warrior, “the man on horseback” named Reza Khan who toppled the
Qajars and made himself shah (king) in 1926. Reza Shah sided with Iran’s largest trading
partner, Germany, before and into World War II and was overthrown when Iran was
occupied by Britain and the Soviet Union. The shah’s son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
succeeded as shah but with little power as the Majlis (parliament) became more powerful
and the constitution was again in force.
Jews who had migrated to Iran were generally well treated but many, like others
in the diaspora, had always longed to return to the homeland from which they had been
driven out; however, they were impeded by logistical, financial, and political
difficulties.26 Many small waves of immigration (Aliyas) occurred while Jerusalem was
under Muslim rule, always with the hope that the Messiah would appear.27
The return-to-Zion notion flourished in the late nineteenth century, promoted by
Theodore Herzl, following the Dreyfus affair in France and increasingly violent pogroms
sweeping throughout Europe. Baron Edmond Rothschild of France, along with others of
wealth, funded land purchases in Palestine for returning Jews in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. As Vali Nasr documents in The Shia Revival, Jews bought Arab
land for prices “forty to eighty times their original purchase price.”28 David Fromkin
agrees, in his book A Peace to End All Peace, “far from being forced to sell to Jews, the
Arabs offered to sell the Jews so much land, that the only limiting factor was money.”29
These historical facts are important, contrasting with the current myth that the Jews took
the land from the Palestinians by force.
By the turn of the century a large, vibrant Jewish community existed in Palestine.
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Jewish immigration continued until stopped by the British in 1939. The possibility of a
Jewish nation had “finally become a reality.”30
The distinctive laws and customs of the Jewish culture set them apart from the
peoples amongst whom they lived. They believed that, in the end, God would bring them
back to Zion. At Passover they have always repeated their ritual prayer “Next year in
Jerusalem.”31 Ruth Gavison makes the case in her piece in New Essays on Zionism that
“at the end of the nineteenth century the Jews did not have the critical mass to establish a
state in Palestine.” However, by “1947, with a thriving Jewish community and political
infrastructure, there was justification for a Jewish State.”32
The Palestinians were opposed to a Jewish nation as were their Arab neighbors.
That land was to be part of the greater “Arab nation” promised to them following World
War I, as a reward for the Arabs fighting against the Ottomans. Promises were made by
the British during that war to both the Arabs and to the Zionists that Palestine would
become part of the “Arab nation” and yet a homeland for the Jews. As Lord Arthur James
Balfour (Balfour Declaration) later said, “We sold the land twice.”33 When British
Foreign Secretary Balfour had sent copies of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, dividing
up the Arab-speaking Middle East, to Colonel Edward M. House, President Woodrow
Wilson’s chief advisor, House replied: “it’s all bad and I told Balfour so. They are
making a breeding place for future wars.”34
At the end of World War II, the British mandate for Palestine was over, the
British were broke, and they were anxious to leave and turn this difficult and costly
League of Nations mandate over to the United Nations. The Zionists deemed US support
critical as that support was needed to get the votes for a UN mandate for partition of
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Palestine into two parts: one Jewish and one Arab-Palestinian. The UN approved
partition in 1947. Like it or not the United States was about to get involved; very
involved.
David McCullough argues in his book Truman that, for the president, “Palestine
was Truman’s most difficult dilemma.”35 As a Senator, Truman favored a Jewish
homeland. “Everyone else who’s been dragged from his country has someplace to go
back to,” Truman said, “but the Jews have no place to go.”36 In the summer of 1947,
many agreed that it was “good politics” to support the new Jewish State as there were 2.5
million Jews in New York alone, who “could be campaign contributors to a destitute
Democratic Party.” Intense pressure from Zionist organizations, however, was “getting
under his skin” as Truman abhorred special interest groups of any kind, and when offered
money from the Jewish lobby he told them to “go to hell.” Eddie Jacobson, Truman’s
former business partner (a Jew but not a Zionist), feared the intense pressure from the
Jewish lobby was “close to causing Truman to be anti-Semitic.”37 Truman was also
mindful of the Arab position in that they “were being made to pay for the crimes of
Hitler.”38
Truman’s secretary of state, George Marshall, was not convinced. He worried
about oil in a possible war with the Soviet Union and the success of the Marshall plan in
which a recovering Europe would need Middle East oil. He was also concerned that US
troops would have to replace departing British troops.39 Following a delayed meeting
with Jewish activist Chaim Weizmann, Truman finally supported a Jewish state. Truman
instructed the US delegation to the UN to vote for partition; it passed by a narrow
margin.40 Pressure from the Jewish lobby in the US, Middle Eastern oil, and the threat of
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Soviet expansion were going to dictate relations between Israel, Iran, and the United
States for the rest of the twentieth century. Israel needed oil to survive and both Israel and
Iran needed US arms and support to thwart Soviet expansion into the Middle East. The
alliance between Israel, Iran, and the United States was evolving.
Eleven minutes after the State of Israel was announced on May 14, 1948, in Tel
Aviv, the United States gave de facto recognition.41 After Turkey, Iran was the second
Muslim nation to recognize Israel as a sovereign nation; the Soviet Union soon followed
with the more formal de jure recognition.42

Figure 1.4. President Harry S. Truman meeting with Prime Minister David BenGurion of Israel and Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on May 8, 1951.43 President
Truman is receiving a gift of a menorah. Photograph by Abbie Rowe. Courtesy of
The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum.
The Arabs immediately declared war but their armies were poorly trained,
shoddily integrated, and were therefore defeated by a better-trained and equipped Israeli
Defense Force (IDF). Israel gained more land (nearly double) than it had been given
under the UN partition. As Ruth Galvison argues, the war was a “tragedy for the Arab
population.”44 Previously, King Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia had summed up the Arab
position when he questioned President Franklin Roosevelt in 1945, “Why should Arabs
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pay with their territory for the crimes committed in Europe against the Jewish people?
Why should Arabs be asked to accept the biblical claim of a religion they do not
themselves embrace?”45 After Israelis defeated the immediate attack by the Arab states
(Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq) in 1948, they began to accept more immigrants
to help build their new country.

Figure 1.5.

In 1949 immigrants flocked to Israel, then one year old.46 Associated
Press. Photograph courtesy of The Associated Press.

In 1956, Israel initiated a preemptive attack against Egypt and Syria, in collusion
with Britain and France, after Egypt’s President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal
Company and closed it to Israel’s ships. President Eisenhower, the Soviet Union, and the
UN demanded the British and French withdraw.47 In 1967, as Egypt, Syria, and other
Arab states were preparing to attack Israel, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) struck a
preemptive attack that destroyed much of the Soviet-supplied Egyptian and Syrian air and
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ground weapons. According to Isabella Ginor, there is evidence the Soviet Union had
been preparing to assist the Arabs.48 As Lawrence Wright in his book The Looming
Tower argues, “The 1967 war was a turning point in the history of the modern Middle
East. The speed and decisiveness of the Israeli victory in the Six Day War humiliated
many Arabs who had believed, until then, that God favored their cause.”49 Shelby Steele,
writing in the Wall Street Journal in June 2010, agrees the Palestinians have not yet
recovered their self-esteem.50
On Yom Kippur in October 1973, better-trained and Soviet-equipped Egyptian
and Syrian armies launched a surprise attack against Israel. Israel was able to achieve
victory only with substantial last-minute military aid from the United States, as Israel was
threatened with defeat.51 The $2.2 billion emergency military assistance from the United
States, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, led to the unintended consequence of a dramatic
increase in the price of oil, harming the US economy. Iran led the price increase. The
shah continued to supply oil to both Israel and Egypt.52 Iranian oil was Iran’s path to
survival and prosperity and oil would intensify Middle East geopolitics for the next
quarter century.
As Daniel Yergin argues in his book The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money &
Power, “in the Twentieth Century oil was central to the security, prosperity and the very
nature of civilization and remains so in the twenty-first century.”53 In the first half of the
twentieth century, Persia and the United States were the major oil producers while the
world was becoming dependent on that resource. It started in 1901 when the British
obtained a concession from Iran, giving them exclusive rights to develop and sell any
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petroleum discovered for sixty years; in 1908, the “greatest oil field ever discovered” was
found in Iran.54
First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill called the Iranian oil discovery “a
prize from fairyland beyond our wildest dreams.” 55
In 1911, Churchill had warned Germany was in its drive for a “place in the sun”
and was rapidly challenging the British navy. Churchill converted the British navy from
dependable Welsh coal to the “distant and insecure oil supplies from Persia” (as Iran was
then still known); this was risky but would give British ships “greater speed and more
efficient use of manpower.”56. The quest for oil had begun and Iran was the key in the
Middle East.
Britain could now obtain all the oil it required at discount prices; after all, they
considered it their oil. The British government eventually obtained ownership of fifty-one
percent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) with tight controls, leaving the
Iranians little compensation for their resource. As Nikki Keddie argues, the AngloPersian agreement removed one of the last vestiges of Iranian sovereignty leading to the
rise of the charismatic leader, Reza Khan, who seized power and then became shah (king)
in 1926.57
After World War II, the Majlis (Iranian parliament) was becoming more powerful
under the leadership of nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh was maneuvering
for a change in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) agreement and demanding a
larger share of the profits, like Saudi Arabia had negotiated with the Arabian-American
Oil Company (ARAMCO). The British rejected Mossadegh’s demands. Mossadegh then
persuaded the Majlis to nationalize the AIOC in 1951, making him a national hero.58
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Mossadegh threatened to oust the British unless they would agree to share oil profits
equally. The British again refused..
In his book All the Shah’s Men, Kinzer argues that Mossadegh was determined to
pursue justice as “foreign intervention was the root of Iran’s troubles and Iran could learn
to run the oil company. … What the British failed to realize was that Mossadegh and the
great majority of Iranians were ready to accept and even embrace much pain in their
sacred cause.” The Shi’ite (Shia) religious tradition blended perfectly with the nationalist
passion sweeping through Iran. Together they “steeled the will of Iranians.”59 Mossadegh
was Time Magazine’s “Man of the Year” announced on the cover of their January 7, 1952
issue.
Mossadegh, “the liberator,” expelled the resisting British from Iran. The British
were furious but had few options other than to invade Iran or try to overthrow the
government. According to the Mossadegh Project website, the Western press, including
the International Herald Tribune and New York Times, weighed in against Iran with
scathing editorials.60 Truman, who had opposed interfering in a sovereign nation,
suggested mediation and opposed the use of force against Iran.61
A new team, under President Dwight Eisenhower, occupied the White House in
1953. After recent communist expansion, including Soviet domination of Eastern Europe,
the fall of China, North Korea invading South Korea, and rumblings in Vietnam, there
was high anxiety about the next “domino to fall.” The CIA, collaborating with the
British, led the plot to force regime change in Iran in 1953. The spin was that
“Mossadegh had communist leanings,” and Iran might fall. As former Secretary of State
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Dean Acheson later wrote regarding the way the British had been involved in the coup, it
was: “obtuse neocolonialism; never had so few lost so much so stupidly and so fast.”62
Mark Gasiorowski, in his piece “The 1953 Coup d’Etat in Iran,” called the
government of Mohammad Mossadegh the “last popular, democratically oriented
government to hold office in Iran.” He continued, “If Mossadegh had not been
overthrown the 1979 revolution might not have occurred, and Iran’s future would
undoubtedly have been vastly different.”63 Gasiorowski agrees the fear of a communist
takeover was valid.64 In Iran, after the coup the shah became more powerful, establishing
martial law for many years and forming his powerful secret police entity, SAVAK.65
Nikki Keddie summarizes that the coup resulted in imprisonment of the popular
Mossadegh while the shah became an increasingly oppressive dictator. The coup, she
argues, “had a traumatic effect on Iranian public opinion which has continued down to
the present.” So much for the United States “supporting a more democratic government
in Iran.”66 Now the shah needed an ally; so did Israel.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ISRAELI-IRANIAN ALLIANCE DEVELOPS
Israel’s long-time foreign policy generally followed the “Alliance of the
Periphery” doctrine outlined by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Israel
cultivated engagement with non-hostile Islamic countries around the periphery of their
Arab enemies, notably Iran, Turkey, Morocco, and Ethiopia. Prime Minister David BenGurion was convinced the Arabs would eventually accept Israel.1
After becoming a state, Israel established a secret permanent delegation in Iran;
an un-official de facto embassy. The shah of Iran was selling oil to Israel and determined
he could benefit from Israel’s technical assistance and get their help in gaining access to
advanced United States weapons. As trade blossomed, in order to keep things under
wraps, he decided the interactions with Israel would be handled by his “dreaded” secret
police, SAVAK. SAVAK in turn dealt through Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad.
Iranian diplomats traveled to Israel via Turkey and, per mutual agreement between Iran
and Israel, never had their passports stamped on arrival in the Jewish state. The shah
wanted to keep this mutually beneficial relationship with Israel at a “healthy distance” to
appease the Arabs.2
In the late 1950s, the Soviets began to ally with the Arab countries after
solidifying their relations with Egypt following the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Nasser was no friend of the shah’s, who was increasingly concerned by pan-Arabism and
Soviet designs on the region, as were Israel and the United States.3 In Iran, the Soviets
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supported the Tudeh party, a liberal party with a pro-Soviet bent. Israel continued the
Ben-Gurion “doctrine of the periphery” and also supported non-Arab minorities, like the
Iraqi Kurds and Lebanese Christians.4 There are countless examples of the robust IsraeliIranian alliance that peaked in the 1970s but continued until the 1990s.
According to a US Library of Congress analysis:
Until the overthrow of the shah's regime in 1979, Israel and Iran had
established government missions in both countries, although this
relationship was never formalized by an exchange of ambassadors. Under
the shah from 1953 to 1979, Iran was one of Israel's primary suppliers of
oil and a major commercial partner. In addition, the intelligence services
of the two countries cooperated closely, and Israel exported military
hardware and provided training and other assistance to Iranian military
forces. These close, but discreet, relations were abruptly terminated in
1979, upon the coming to power of the regime of Ayatollah Sayyid
Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini and Iran's joining of the anti-Israel camp.
Shortly thereafter, Iran called for the "eradication" of the state of Israel
through armed struggle and its replacement by a Palestinian state. As a
symbolic gesture, the PLO was given the building of the former Israeli
mission in Tehran.
In the 1980s, however, Israeli concern about the fate of the approximately
30,000 Jews remaining in Iran, interest in assisting Iran in its war with
Iraq, and cooperation with the United States in its efforts to free American
hostages held by Iranian-backed Shia extremists in Lebanon, led to a
renewal of contacts between Israeli and Iranian leaders and shipments of
Israeli arms to Tehran. Israel reportedly sent arms to Iran in exchange for
Iran allowing thousands of Jews to leave the country.5
Two major joint ventures between Israel and Iran in the 1950-1979 period were
the Eliat-Ashkelon pipeline and a joint missile technology program. In his book
Treacherous Alliance, Trita Parsi related an interview he had with long time Jerusalem
journalist and analyst Ehud Yaari (still a respected commentator on Middle East affairs
and for 35 years a commentator on Israeli television). Yaari referred to the “good old
days” before the revolution when intelligence cooperation between the two countries was
extensive and Israeli tourists flocked to visit Iran—the only Middle Eastern country
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where the Israelis were welcome at the time.”6 In his recent book Iranophobia: The Logic
of an Israeli Obsession, Haggai Ram cites an article in the Israeli daily, Davar,
describing the life of Israeilis in Iran in those days: “Most Israelis congregated in Iran as
representatives of medium and large companies where they rented offices, sometimes
buildings, hundreds of cars and hundreds of apartments. They took part in the best
parties, attending French and Italian operas imported for foreigners. Most had maids
imported from the Philippines.”7

Figure 2.1. Iranian Foreign Minister Reza Saffinia arriving at the house of Israeli
president Chaim Weizmann in Rehovot on Yom Ha’atzmaut, 1950. Photograph
courtesy The State of Israel National Photo Collection.8
After the 1956 Suez crisis, Iran helped finance construction of an eight-inch oil
pipeline from Eliat in southern Israel through Beersheba to Israel’s Mediterranean
coastline. The first Iranian oil was transported in 1957. The Eliat-Ashkelon Pipeline
Company was formalized in 1968 as a 50/50 joint venture between Israel and Iran, to
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transport crude oil from Iran to Europe while bypassing the strategically vulnerable Suez
Canal. Israel has received all of its crude oil from Iran, with few interruptions, since that
time. In 2003 a reverse flow project was completed to allow Russian oil to flow from
Ashkelon to Eliat, to be reloaded in ships for delivery to Asia.9 Oil trumped politics.
Israel and Iran joined forces for an extensive missile development venture in the
waning days of the shah’s regime. The shah decided Iran needed deterrent capabilities
against Iraqi Scuds and turned to the United States to purchase Pershing missiles. The
Carter administration turned him down, citing the missiles’ potential to carry nuclear
warheads. Iran turned to Israel as they were willing to offer the technical assistance that
the West wasn’t willing to share.
Project Flower was a joint collaboration between Iran and Israel for co-production
of Israel’s Jericho-2 missile, a sea-to-sea missile with a range of 200 kilometers and an
advanced version of the US Harpoon missile. Project Flower involved planning by key
players in 1977, including Israeli’s former defense minister Ezer Weizmann and General
Hassan Toufanian, Iran’s deputy minister of war and armaments. The following year,
Iran constructed a new missile assembly facility near Sirjan, in south-central Iran, with
Israeli assistance.10 The missile project officially ended when the shah was overthrown.
Documents taken from the Den of Spies collection of papers, found in the US
Embassy in Tehran in 1979, confirm Project Flower. The documents validate that in the
late 1970s the shah provided large quantities of oil to Israel to fund a clandestine project
to produce Israel’s Jericho-2 missile, eventually capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
The test firings were to be conducted in Iran.11
Bergman’s book, The Secret War With Iran, discusses another missile project
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with “Israel agreeing to sell Iran long range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles under the
name Operation Tzor (Tzur).”12 Parsi argues what Israel called Operation Tzor was part
of Project Flower.13
An article published the New York Times in 1986 and written by Elaine Sciolino
details how Israel was involved in a multi-billion-dollar project to modify advanced,
surface-to-surface missiles for sale to Iran, referring to documents left behind in Tehran
by Israeli diplomats. She reports this was “one of six oil-for-arms contracts signed in
April 1977 in Tehran by the shah and Shimon Peres, then the Israeli Defense Minister.
The documents validate the two nations had robust trade missions and joint missile
development”14
Parsi quotes Harold Saunders, former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern
Affairs, as saying “It surprises me that the Israelis would have brought the Iranians into
the development of a missile that may have been part of their nuclear program.” He also
quotes Gary Sick, Iran specialist on the National Security Council staff under President
Jimmy Carter, as saying “I was surprised by the documents, surprised to learn that two
countries closely allied with the United States were conducting joint military operations
without talking to us about them.”15 Also, Sick mentions Israel’s expertise in irrigation
was highly valued by “the technology-starved Iranians” who benefited from Israel’s
advances in agriculture.16
All these various sources confirm that Iran and Israel had an extensive trade and
military alliance during the early 1950s that lasted until the shah was overthrown. Iran’s
programs were financed by US aid and oil revenues that quadrupled after the 1973 ArabIsraeli war. Israel was also financed by US foreign aid. Israel and Iran then became allied
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with the United States as bulwarks against the threat of communist expansion in the
Middle East.
When the British decided to withdraw from East of Suez in 1971, Iran saw an
opportunity to control the Persian Gulf. The United States, still bogged down in Vietnam,
began to support Iran in order to help deter Soviet penetration into the Middle East.
President Nixon proclaimed his Twin Pillar policy, leaving security in the gulf to Iran and
Saudi Arabia. “I just wish there were a few more leaders around the world with his
foresight,” Nixon said of the shah in April 1971.17 According to the CIA, Nixon offered
the shah any and all non-nuclear US weapons. (This is confirmed in secret National
Security Archives dated July 25, 1972.18) Gary Sick argues in his book, All Fall Down:
America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, “The arms purchase by the shah can only be
described as a stampede. In the first four years after Nixon’s visit, the shah purchased
over $9 billion in arms from the United States.”19
Ram argues the shah dreamt of “resurrecting Iran’s past glory and becoming the
mighty power it once was. Iran’s quest for regional primacy has been the norm for Iran
throughout its three thousand year history; therefore Iranians have always aspired to the
role of primus inter pares in regional politics.”20 In October 1971, to resurrect Iran’s past
glory and the shah’s dream to re-create the Persian Empire, the shah threw an extravagant
party inviting world dignitaries to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire.
The shah’s minister of court wrote that Iran was “rapidly assuming leadership not only of
the Persian Gulf but over the entire Middle East.”21
After President Sadat of Egypt broke with the Soviets, Iraq received more support
from the Soviets and began to replace Egypt as Iran’s major foe. The shah was
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increasingly concerned about Soviet support for Iraq since such an alliance increased the
threat to Iran from Iraq. At the same time, Ram argues, the shah became increasingly
dependent on Israeli know-how.22 The shah was determined to be the “preeminent power
of the Persian Gulf,” the “Japan of the Middle East.” Escalating oil revenues increased
his power and wealth. (From 1968-1973 Iran’s gross domestic product [GDP] grew at a
12% annual rate and in 1973 and 1974 by 34% and 43%, respectively. 23) However, as
Keddie argues, “the high growth rate did not lessen the income disparity between the rich
and the poor.”24
In 1973 the shah pushed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) for a redoubling of oil prices (oil prices had already been doubled after the 1973
war; later that year the shah successfully pushed for doubling again), proclaiming Iran
would soon “become one of the world’s five great powers.”25 As the shah became more
powerful, he no longer needed Israel’s support as much. Besides, Israeli control of
Jerusalem and Islamic holy places since the 1967 war was an indignity to all Muslims.
Also, the 1973 war had dispelled the myth of Israel’s invincibility.26 The shah was
becoming self-obsessed.27 Islam and the Middle East had their new leader—or did they?
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ALLIANCE STARTS TO UNRAVEL
The alliance began to unravel. The shah increased tensions by signing the Algiers
Accord, without consulting Israel or the United States, in the spring of 1975. The Algiers
Accord was negotiated between Iran and Iraq to settle a dispute over borders and the
Shatt al-Arab water navigation rights. The shah never sought ratification by the Majles.
The shah was his own man.1 Israel considered the Algiers Accord to be a threat, as peace
between Iran and her Arab neighbors would diminish the need for Iran to be allied with
Israel. The accord also ended the long-time Israeli support of the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi
Kurds had also been supported by Iran to destabilize Iraq. Freeing Iraq from Kurdish
influence would allow Saddam Hussein to further expand his military.2
Israel’s Likud Party was voted into power in 1977 under the leadership of
Menachem Began, a figure from the Israeli right with an attachment to “Greater Israel.”
“Greater Israel” is a “secular ideology of the Likud party as a fulfillment of a biblical
promise.”3 Steven Erlanger wrote in a New York Times article in 2005, quoting Eyal Arad
who joined Likud 30 years previously at age 17, "We had a dream – Jewish sovereignty
in the biblical Land of Israel, on both banks of the Jordan River, and Palestinians could
have self-rule but not independence," he said. "I believe it was a beautiful and just dream,
but it crashed against the walls of reality, of a rapidly growing Arab population, a falling
rate of Jewish immigration and the Palestinian demand for a sovereign state."4
The shah preferred to work with the Israeli Labor Party as he believed they would
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listen and were opposed to the Likud policy of expansion of settlements into the West
Bank, which Israel had captured in the 1967 war. The Israelis were still determined to
intensify their alliance with Iran as they concluded that peace with the Arabs was unlikely
and they could deal with Iran; after all they were both culturally superior to the Arabs.
The shah, however, determined Israel was becoming an increasingly belligerent state.5
The shah was concerned about the development of nuclear power in India and
other Middle Eastern counties. In the summer of 1978, after years of negotiation, the shah
completed a nuclear pact with the Carter administration to buy nuclear reactors.
However, the deal meant that Iran was restricted from producing plutonium or nuclear
weapons. The shah also had other nuclear reactor deals with Great Britain, France, and
West Germany. To justify the pact: on December 31, 1977 President Carter, agreeing
with the Nixon administration, had called the monarchy “an island of stability in a sea of
turmoil.”6 According to documents recently released by the National Security Archive,
the Ford and Carter administrations were worried about Iran developing a nuclear
weapon.7
The Israeli-Iranian alliance was about to abort. No one saw what was happening
in Iran, except Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad. The Iranian air force chief had asked
Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to “tell the Shah what is the reality in Iran.” The
Shah, he argued, “is sitting on a high chair, everyone just say yes, yes, yes.” The Iranian
generals were “too afraid to challenge the Shah’s authority or even explain the full extent
of the instability.”8
In 1979, the Islamic Revolution replaced the Pahlavi dynasty with an Islamic
republic, the modern world’s first Islamic theocratic regime. The CIA was surprised,
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Mossad not so, since they had witnessed the Shah’s loss of popular support, the Shah’s
loss of reality, and his inability to make decisions. Weiner argues in Legacy of Ashes that
the CIA totally missed the uprising in Iran, writing “We were just plain asleep; we did
not understand who Khomeini was.”9 The shah fled the country in January 1979.
Shahpour Bakhtiar became prime minister, stopping oil shipments to Israel. However, he
resigned in February 1980 when the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran in order to
assume power.10
Iran historian Nikki Keddie argues, “The Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979, like
many revolutions, unites several groups, classes and parties with disparate ideas who
were against the old regime. As in many revolutions, the coalition did not long outlast
victory. Iran’s revolution had distinctive features, especially the leading role of the
clerics. Some revolutions have had religious ideologies, but clerical rule after a revolution
was new.”11
Khomeini and his followers had kept out of circulation in 1978-1979. Khomeini
had previously released his treatise on Islamic government: Velayet-e faqih (guardianship
of the jurisprudent), which endorsed novel Shia arguments including great power for a
single faqih. Khomeini had made several publicly recorded statements that neither he nor
the ulama would hold direct power in a new government. In the initial period of his rule,
he had renounced these ideas in his Islamic Government publication. By 1983 clerical
forces increased their power causing some oppositional Iranians to claim Khomeini had
“hijacked the revolution.” Many Iranians who had supported the revolution because of
the corrupt regime of the shah were riled by the final result.12
The alliance between Israel and Iran had come to an end, or so it seemed.
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However, Israel still needed oil from Iran and many Jews remained there. Iranians would
soon come knocking at Israel’s door, as they had no other choice and the door was ajar.
Many Jews left Iran after the revolution, as it became a dangerous place. The
Israeli mission headquarters was invaded and burned. Anti-Israeli sentiment intensified,
as the revolutionaries labeled Israel “a usurper of Muslim land.” Iran’s revolutionaries
considered the US the “Great Satan” and Israel to be “Little America,” both enemies of
the revolution.13
The deposed shah was ill and sought treatment in the United States, which was
finally allowed. Weiner recounts that the CIA warned President Carter this could cause a
hostage problem. The unwillingness of the United States to turn over the Shah to the
Iranian revolutionaries changed the November 4, 1979, “amateurish plan to take a few
American hostages for a few days” into an “unprecedented international ordeal that
turned into a 444-day humiliation for the Carter administration.”14 This incident evolved
into the birth of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).15 Carter severed all
diplomatic ties with Tehran; however, Israel still regarded Iran as a valuable ally. Israel
hoped the new regime would soon collapse and the real Iran would emerge. Israel still
considered Iraq a greater threat than Iran to its security.16
There were still common fundamental threats that Iran and Israel shared even as
the revolution took power. There were hostile Arab nations surrounding them and the
Soviet superpower to the north. Egypt had always been the leader of the Arab states but
was shunned after the Camp David Accords. Iran was intent on filling the vacuum of
Islamic leadership but the Sunni Arab nations like Saudi Arabia weren’t buying it.17 Iran
would need Israel’s help again and Israel needed oil. Israel wanted the remaining Israeli
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hostages returned and sought the release of those Iranian Jews who still wanted to leave
Iran.
Following the Camp David Accords and the US-Iranian hostage crisis in January
1981, Prime Minister Begin went back on his word to Carter and resumed the sale of
arms to Iran, as soon as Reagan was elected.18 As Bergman argues in The Secret War
with Iran, Israel feared Saddam with his weapons of mass destruction more than Iran.
Thus, selling arms to Iran made possible the idea to “let them kill each other with them.”
Besides, there were Jews in Iran who wanted out.19
In 1980 the son of Iran’s Grand Ayatollah Kashani, Ahmed Kashani, visited Israel
and was “most likely the first Iranian to do so after the revolution.” The visit resulted in
Iran obtaining some spare parts for Iran’s US-built fighter planes. They also discussed
possible military cooperation against Iraq’s nuclear program at Osirak. Prime Minister
Begin approved parts and weapons shipments to Iran. In return, Khomeini allowed a
large number of Iranian Jews to leave Iran. Iran was again secretly dealing with Israel and
selling them oil.20 Israel was continuing the Periphery Policy. With Iraq threatening,
suddenly Iran again needed Israeli help for access to American arms; however, the United
States had an arms embargo against Iran.
Iraq was assuming a leadership position in the Arab world, vacated by Egypt
following the signing of the Camp David Accords. Iraq, lusting for Iran’s southern oil
fields, broke relations with Iran and declared the Shatt al-Arab part of its territory,
breaking the Algiers Accord. Iraq also feared a Shia revolt in southern Iraq since Iran
sought to spread their Islamic revolution to other countries with large Shia populations.
Sensing Iran’s vulnerability, Iraq created an incident and invaded Iran on September 22,
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1980. As Ali M. Ansari argues in his book Confronting Iran: The Failure of American
Foreign Policy, Iraq had immediate air superiority because Iran’s air force had
deteriorated, they lacked spare parts, and military maintenance was neglected since Iran’s
military had been left “unattended during the 20-month revolution.”21
Ronen Bergman agrees, explaining that, after the revolution, “thirteen thousand
Iranian officers resigned or were dismissed. Seventy senior generals, of the shah’s eighty,
were executed.”22 In 1980 the Revolutionary Guards had taken command of the armed
forces but they were not trained officers. Saddam Hussein was well aware of Iran’s
weaknesses: the purge of the officer corps and the embargo of any flow of US arms to
Iran.
Some in Iran wanted Israel and the United States to stage another coup to
dethrone Khomeini.23 Israel actually did intervene in the war; on June 7, 1981, the Iraqi
research plutonium reactor at Osirak was destroyed by the Israeli air force. Israeli and
Iranian representatives had met secretly (to plan the attack) in France, one month prior to
the Israeli strike.24 Iran had previously bombed and damaged the facility in September
1980 and indicated they would allow the Israeli air force to land at Tabriz in case of an
emergency.25
Iran responded to Iraq’s attack with a massive army build-up. Bergman argues
that Khomeini “grasped that the war held a powerful attraction for Iran’s teenagers” and
boys older than twelve could join the Basij, who were willing to self-sacrifice in the
battlefield, overwhelming Iraqi forces. Iran counter-attacked and finally entered Iraqi
territory toward Basara, a Shiite stronghold, in the fall of 1981. The hoped-for support
from Iraqi Shia did not materialize and an eight-year stalemate resulted.26
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Moscow supported Iraq, as did most of the Arab states including the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). Most Western nations, including the United States, also
supported Iraq. Iran had no friends and desperately needed US spare parts for its US-built
weapons obtained under the shah. Mersheimer and Walt, in The Israeli Lobby and U.S.
Foreign Policy, concluded the United States supported Iraq because it feared Iran might
win the war.27 That eventuality would alter the balance of power and give Iran regional
hegemony that would strengthen Islamic revolutionary influence in the Arab world.28
Israel began shipping arms to Iran under the clandestine Operation Seashell, by
way of Transport Areo Rioplantese (TAR), an Argentinian cargo airline. Bergman argues
that the amount of arms shipped to Iran would “put the Iran-Contra scandal to shame.”
Besides hoping for mutual destruction in the war between Iran and Iraq, the Israeli
weapons industry wanted to make money. Iran purchased over $500 million worth of
arms from Israel in the 1980-1983 period, mostly paid for by Iranian oil delivered to
Israel.29 Israel used Argentinian air transports to ship arms to Iran on an almost daily
basis. On July 24, 1981, an Argentinian cargo aircraft carrying Israeli arms to Iran
crashed near the Soviet-Turkish border. Khomeini continued his usual “Israel should be
eliminated” mantra. Meanwhile, Israel had other objectives and decided to make their
move.
Israel’s air force attacked Lebanon on June 6, 1982, including destroying over 100
Syrian aircraft, without losing any Israeli planes. Ariel Sharon, Israeli Defense Force
(IDF) minister, was known to have been planning the attack on Lebanon for many
months, in order to kick out the PLO who had moved in and exploited Lebanon during its
long civil war. Sharon also wanted to drive the Syrians out of Lebanon. The Shia, in
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Southern Lebanon, were sick of the PLO (who treated Southern Lebanon as their own
country) and welcomed the invasion at first. However, following the massive destruction
of Lebanese infrastructure and killing of Lebanese civilians, the Shia minority quickly
turned against the Israelis, who came to be seen as aggressive occupiers. As an
unintended consequence a new militant resistance group, Hezbollah, was born.30
Lebanon’s newly elected President Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite Christian (and
CIA source), was assassinated on September 14, 1982. For revenge, Maronite allies,
abetted by the IDF, slaughtered seven hundred Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila
refugee camps near Beirut on September 16, 1982. President Reagan sent US Marines to
“keep the peace” but there was “no peace to keep.”31 The following spring the US
embassy was destroyed by Hezbollah terrorists after the Americans were seen to be
“siding with the Maronite-Christians,” since the US navy was shelling Muslim positions.
On October 23, 1983, Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyah induced his terrorist followers to
drive a truck-bomb into the American barracks near the Beirut airport, killing 241 US
marines and 58 French paratroopers.32 Hezbollah also captured a group of US hostages
that would prove to be an important bargaining tool for them and for Iran in the future.33
In his book Legacy of Ashes, Tim Weiner explains the CIA’s position on the
situation in Lebanon: Many Lebanese despised the “power of the Maronite community”
and saw it as arguably “the principle cause of the ongoing Lebanese civil war that had
opened the way for the Israeli invasion in 1982.” The CIA sought to help rebuild Beirut
after the Israeli bombing but did not see “the new force rising from the rubble”
(Hezbollah). After the 1983 embassy bombing in Lebanon, most of the CIA operatives
were lost in the destruction, leaving the US “with too little intelligence for a long time
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thereafter.” The CIA chose to see the Islamic threat in the Middle East through the
“Israeli prism” (Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad).34
In 1983, Iraq began to use chemical weapons and missiles against Iran, making
Iran even more desperate.35 Iran decided to reach out to Israel again, in order to get more
arms. Israel was anxious to improve relations with Iran to counter Arab and Soviet threats
to both Israel and Iran (and presumably to get Iranian oil). US National Security advisor
Robert McFarlane was also becoming increasingly concerned about potential Soviet
influence in a post-Khomeini Iran. By 1985 President Reagan approved secret feelers
toward Iran, bypassing the CIA and the State Department, to see if Iran could help free
American hostages still held by Hezbollah in Lebanon.36 The US embargo on arms sales
to Iran was about to change but not everyone was on board.37
The Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair,
written by Lee Hamilton and Daniel Inouye, provides details on how Israel, and, then the
United States, became involved in the “arms for hostage” arrangement that enabled the
United States to circumvent its own policies banning the distribution of arms to a terrorist
state. Iran had not only taken US embassy staff as hostages for 444 days in Tehran, it also
supported Hezbollah whose terrorists had killed two hundred twenty American marines
(plus eighteen navy and three army personnel and fifty-eight French paratroopers). Also,
there were the sixty US embassy personnel who had been massacred by Hezbollah
terrorists a few months earlier. In addition, there were still US hostages held in Lebanon.
On January 11, 1984, the United States had labeled Iran a “terrorist state.”38
According to the report, “For many Americans, the most surprising and alarming
aspect of the Iran-Contra Affair was President Reagan’s decision to sell arms to Iran.”
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This occurred only twenty months after the Lebanese terrorists, supported by Iran, had
humiliated the United States by killing Americans and taking American hostages. The
United States had “embargoed the sale of arms to Iran” after the attacks on the
Americans. The Reagan Administration declared “Iran is supporting terrorism.” United
States policy toward Iran was stated clearly: “We make no concessions. We make no
deals.”39 The subsequent sale of arms to Iran destroyed much of the credibility of the
Reagan administration.
President Reagan spoke on the subject again on June 30, 1985. The United States,
he said, gives terrorists “no rewards and no guarantees.” Just a few weeks later Reagan
authorized Israel to sell the Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire command, anti-tank
(TOW) missiles to the government of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Seven months later he
authorized the direct sale of arms to Iran. The transactions with Iran continued for 15
months. Occasionally a hostage, held by Hezbollah, was released after some of the
shipments.40
The Iran-Contra report goes on to explain, “In Jerusalem, officials were eager for
better relations with Iran, for two very pragmatic reasons: commercial and diplomatic.”
Under the shah, Israel had long and friendly relations with Iran. Despite revolutionary
Iran’s vow to destroy Israel, the Israelis still regarded Iraq as a greater threat than Iran.
Israel wanted to create conditions for resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations
with “a post-Khomeini regime.”41 Manucher Ghorbanifar, an arms dealer living in Paris,
facilitated the arms sales. He became the “conduit for US arms to Iran working through
Israel, initially without approval of Secretary of State George Shultz, defense Secretary
Casper Weinberger or the US embassy in Tel-Aviv. Initially only National Security
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Advisor (NSA) Robert McFarlane and his staff were involved with the arms sales.42
At first, President Reagan “was not willing to sell arms directly to Iran” but did
approve “in principle” the sale of American TOWs by Israel.43 The first 99 TOWs arrived
in Iran in August 1985, resulting in no hostage releases; another 408 TOWs were sent by
Israel, resulting in the release of one hostage in Lebanon. The hard-bargaining Iranians
wanted more, including a HAWK-200 (Raytheon MIM-23 surface to air) sidewinder
missiles and 30 to 50 Phoenix (AIM-54 long range air-to-air) missiles. The arrangement
was becoming very complicated.
Colonel Oliver North devised a new plan for selling arms directly to Iran that was
approved by the president. (North was on President Reagan’s National Security Council.)
Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger opposed
North’s plan. Schultz told Reagan the United States was falling into an “arms for
hostages” situation; it was a “bad idea,” and the government “shouldn’t do it.”44 Early in
1986, the United States went ahead and sold arms directly to Iran and funneled some of
the profits to a group called the Contras who were fighting the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua—another illegal scheme devised by Colonel North. CIA director William
Casey was totally behind financing the war in Central America with “money from
abroad” but had been forbidden to do so by Congress; he then favored acting covertly.45
An article written by Jim Hoagland and Glenn Frankel in the Washington Post on
February 12, 1987, confirmed Secretary of State Shultz was by-passed and remained
opposed to the arms shipments, as was Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.46
Israel, concerned about the Jews in Iran, was motivated to continue to send arms,
while trying to soothe tensions between Iran and Washington. Israel feared an Iraqi
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victory; in addition, the Israeli weapons industry “wanted to make money.”47 Iran was
also seeking missile technology from China and North Korea to counter the Scud missiles
Russia supplied to Iraq. Iran, using Israeli technology, began producing their own
Shahab-1 missiles and eventually had enough to launch a barrage toward Baghdad. In
1988, this became the “War of the Cities,” which lasted 52 days, during which 532
missiles were launched by both sides. Iran was exhausted and petitioned for peace,
ending the war in August 1988. As Gary Sick concludes in his book All Fall Down:
America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, despite the expenditure of many thousands of
lives, the battle lines remained static. Iran, Sick commented, “snatched ruin and
humiliation from the jaws of victory.”48
In October 1987 Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared: “Iran is Israel’s
best friend and we do not intend to change our position in relation to Tehran, because
Khomeini’s regime will not last forever.” Iran’s interest in Israel was for spare parts for
their war with Iraq and access to US weapons including better relations with the United
States.49
As the Iraq-Iran war ended in 1988, the borders had not changed, there were a
million casualties, and yet Iraq had a “larger and mightier army than ever.” Possibly Iraq
could attack Israel and recapture their standing with the Arabs. Some in Israel were
starting to have a different view: maybe the periphery doctrine was dead. Iraq was still a
counter to a fundamentalist Iran; however, the geo-political map would soon change.50
Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, bringing a moment of hope that perhaps Iranian
moderates would end the Israeli-Iranian estrangement. In November 1989 Israel resumed
purchasing Iranian oil. The way the Iran-Iraq war had ended was devastating to Iran’s
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ambition of spreading the revolution and resulted in moderation of the ideological zeal
and the beginning of what they termed “pragmatic policies.” This culminated in the 1989
election of Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as president. In 1988, before Khomeini died,
he created a constitutional committee to more clearly define the powers of the faqih, the
Majlis, and the Guardian council. The faqih’s powers would still include serving as
commander of the armed forces; declaring war and peace; and controlling appointments
to the Guardian Council, the judiciary, and the state media. After Khomeini died,
Hojjatoleslam Ali Khamenei was quickly named Ayatollah and faqih, with these powers.
Khamenei, with “weak religious credentials,” was not widely accepted by the clerical
establishment in Qom.51
An Associated Press (AP) article published in the New York Times on December
20, 1989, was titled “Israel-Iran Oil deal disclosed and tied to Captives.” Israel, they
reported, paid Iran $36 million for oil hoping to encourage Iran to use its influence to
help free the last three Israeli soldiers still held in Lebanon. The United States was
backing the deal hoping for release of the remaining American hostages also held in
Lebanon. The Israeli position, the article concluded, was that “Iran has oil and Iran has
Jews which are reasons to renew connections with them.” The article also quoted Joseph
Alpher of Tel Aviv University’s Jaffe Center as saying “considerations other than the
release of prisoners could justify ties with Iran.”52
Newly elected President George H. W. Bush had announced a “goodwill begets
goodwill” gesture in his inaugural speech on January 29, 1989. The Bush administration
urged Rafsanjani to use Iran’s “considerable political capital in Lebanon” to obtain the
release of the remaining US hostages held by Hezbollah. Bush indicated there would be a
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reciprocal gesture toward Iran by the United States.53
Iran’s new leadership had also lowered its rhetoric against the Arab countries of
the Persian Gulf and had not as yet endorsed Sunni fundamentalist groups like Hamas.
Rafsanjani indicated Iran would support whatever agreement the Palestinians settled on
with Israel. Bush’s national Security advisor Brent Scowcroft had said, in late 1991, it
might be possible to take Iran off the terrorist list, reduce economic sanctions, and further
compensate Iranians for the shooting down of an Iranian civilian Airbus jet with a missile
launched by a United States ship in July 1988, by mistake. (All 290 Iranian passengers
and crew had been killed.) Scowcroft indicated the administration was even considering
allowing the sale of some airplanes and parts and easing other economic sanctions on
Iran.54
Bush did not respond to Iran’s gesture, even after the last hostage, reporter Terry
Anderson, was finally released in December 1991. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
had been known as the CIA’s “hardliner” on the Soviet Union and Iran and had
previously urged Bush not to respond to Iran’s goodwill gestures. Gates argued, “We
have to look at the history of outreach (to Iran) that was very real, under successive
presidents, yet did not yield any results.” Gates’ vetoing of the Bush plan to reciprocate
Iran’s goodwill gesture was, as he explained later to Congress, developed because “new
intelligence showed Iran was seeking weapons of mass destruction and planning terrorist
attacks.” Gates often repeated in CIA staff meetings that the “only moderate Iranian is
one who has run out of bullets.”55
Rafsanjani never forgave the Americans for Bush’s reneging on his promise of
goodwill after the hostages were released or for Iran’s exclusion from the Madrid (and
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Oslo) Conferences.56
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE TABLES TURN; PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
Dramatic changes came to the Middle East between 1990 and 1992 with the
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, and the final collapse of the Soviet Union
in December 1991. The United States went out of its way to attract Arab support for its
coalition to counter Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait: an Arab state attacking another Arab
state. As a non-Arab state, Israel could not be included in the coalition, even though
thirty-four Scud missiles were lobbed toward Tel Aviv by Iraq during the war, with no
Israeli response.1 Israel witnessed their greatest threat: the Arab states now working with
the United States, their only remaining friend, to repel Saddam’s invasion. Israel was also
aware of President Bush’s “goodwill that begets goodwill” initiative, reaching out to Iran.
The common threats that nourished a volatile alliance between Israel and Iran were
diminished or no longer there.
As Iraq was quickly defeated by a US-led coalition that included Arab countries,
Iraq was perceived as no longer a significant threat to Iran. Thus Iran was freed up to
become more of a threat to Israel. Israel also recognized it was no longer needed to
support the United States as a bulwark against Soviet penetration into the Middle East.
Suddenly Israel was even more alone. Iran, rebuffed by Bush, began to use more if its
resources to increase its support of Hezbollah and further Shia fundamentalist changes in
Lebanon and elsewhere. A better-armed Hezbollah was becoming more of a threat to
Israel. In order to assure continued unequivocal support from the United States, Israel
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needed a new enemy to counter the loss of the Soviet and Arab threats to the region.2
Others also agreed that Israel was becoming increasingly irrelevant. In an autumn
1990 interview published in the Journal of Palestinian Studies, William Waldergrave,
Britain’s minister of state for foreign affairs, confirmed he had recently made the
statement in Parliament that “In the new Middle East, Israel had ceased to matter.”3
Noted Middle East historian Bernard Lewis went further in 1992, saying “some see Israel
as a strategic liability.”4 Parsi argues that Israeli leaders felt the United States was “no
longer trustworthy and could not be relied on when it came to Israel’s existence.”5
To make matters worse for Israel, Iran not only came out against Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait, they also allowed the United States to use Iran’s airspace while denying Iraq’s
requests for help. US Secretary of State James Baker had praised Iran for its assistance.6
Israel felt threatened by Iran cozying up to the United States. Following the war with
Iraq, Iran acquired Scud-B and Scud-C missiles (renamed Shahab-1 and Shahab-2) and
received a production line for missiles from North Korea.7
Israelis determined they needed to change direction to keep the United States in
line, as the US was becoming too cozy with Iran. As late as June 1991, Israel’s leadership
still had not yet publicly identified Iran as a major threat. In a June 1991 talk given by
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,
Rabin did not identify Iran as a major threat following the outcome of the first Gulf War.
Rabin stated, “Arab armies are our main security concern.” He referred to Palestinian
terrorism as a “nuisance” but not an existential threat to Israel. He also said he did not see
the need for another preemptive war as “we have enough land and no territorial need
could justify a war initiative.” He did not yet mention Iran as a potential enemy.8
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Iranian president Rafsanjani (1989 to 1997) was known as a pragmatic
conservative. In spite of the Bush snub in 1992, he wanted to end international isolation,
instead seeking improved relations with the United States, and focus on reconstruction of
the economy and the goal of becoming a model for other Muslim states. As we shall see,
President Rafsanjani was repeatedly snubbed by the United States. Iran was not invited to
either the Madrid or Oslo proceedings and was snubbed again by President George H. W.
Bush when he ignored Iran’s offer to help get the remaining United States hostages
released from Lebanon and ignored again after they did.
Following the 1991 Gulf War, US Secretary of State James Baker concluded the
time was right and the United States had the political capital to enable a breakthrough in
peace negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis. His first step was brokering the
Madrid Conference that took place in October 1991. Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel
were included. Iran was not invited. Altogether forty-three nations had been invited
including fifteen regional states. Parsi argues that Tehran believed “that its opportunity
had come to be accepted as a regional power and they should be included in Middle East
decision making.” Baker’s snub frustrated Rafsanjani’s policy of detente with
Washington. Iran felt humiliated again and began to increase support for Hezbollah and
now Hamas.9
The next peace initiative, the Oslo Accords, was concluded in 1993. As in
Madrid, Iran was again excluded. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat even renounced violence.
Following the Oslo Accords, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres called the meeting
“The Dawn of Peace.” Israel, he said, wanted a “secure future,” stating, “we gave the
most.” Israel stopped all settlements in the West Bank, gave autonomy for Jerusalem
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including universal access, and was willing to exit Lebanon and the Golan Heights in
exchange for the right to exist within “secure borders.”10 Peres had always hoped the
Arabs would produce another leader like Anwar Sadat to negotiate with, lamenting that if
“Ben-Gurion had had a realistic counterpart, the history of the Middle East would have
been different.”11

Figure 4.1. The Handshake: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO
Chairman Yasser Arafat with US President Bill Clinton, September 13, 1993.12
Courtesy of The William J. Clinton Presidential Library.
Rabin was given the Nobel Peace Prize, along with Shimon Peres and Yasser
Arafat, for signing the Oslo Agreement (Oslo 1 Accord) in 1993. The agreement
included, for the first time, Israel recognizing the PLO and Arafat recognizing Israel
including territorial agreements with land swaps.13 The Israeli right was horrified and
maligned the agreement, leading to the assassination of Rabin in 1995 by an Israeli rightwing fanatic. Bethine Church (widow of former Idaho Senator Frank Church), a friend of
Rabin’s, blames the rhetoric of opposition leader, Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel’s Prime
Minister 1996-1999 and 2009-present) and the increasing influence of the Israeli right
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wing as provoking the assassination.14
As a result of the Oslo negotiations, a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was
signed in 1994. Investment in Israel began to skyrocket and Oslo made it possible for
African, Asian, and even some Arab states to accept Israel one by one. Next a peace
treaty between Israel and Syria almost happened.
Israel concluded the Arab threat had diminished and anticipated that if Iran came
to terms with the United States, Iran could impose a “new order” in the Middle East.
Iran’s expanded missile program intensified the threat, as did its increased support of
Hezbollah.15 Iran also indicated it would “offer limitless support for the opponents of
Oslo.” Parsi argues, “Almost overnight the cold peace that reigned between Israel and
Iran in the 1980’s turned into a cold war.”16
Not everyone was supportive of Oslo. Noted Professor Edward Said in an article
titled “The Morning After,” called Oslo “an instrument of Palestinian surrender.” He
argues that in Rabin’s September 1993 press conference, it was stated the agreement gave
Israel the right to continue to “hold the Jordan river, the boundaries with Egypt,
Jerusalem and the land between Gaza and Jerico.”17 Anthony Chase commenting on
Said’s Anti-Oslo Writings argues he understands Said’s position but notes that Said and
other rejectionists offered no “positive alternatives.”18
Oslo soon failed mainly because opposition leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and
Ariel Sharon (Prime Minister 2001-2005) did not want Oslo to succeed.19 The PLO again
began resorting to violence, while Israel increased settlements in the West Bank. (Israelis
refer to the West Bank as Judea and Samaria.)
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Even after the Oslo Accords were signed in September 1993, Israel continued to
trade with Iran through third parties. Parsi argues that Iran felt threatened by a potential
peace treaty between Israel and Syria, as Iran would lose its influence and access to
Hezbollah in Lebanon, becoming further isolated.20 The assassination of Israeli Prime
Minister Rabin on November 4, 1995, was hailed in Iran as “the will of providence.”
Some in Iran referred to Rabin as a terrorist.21
An editorial by the award-winning foreign correspondent for the Washington
Post, David Hoffman, reported on this transformation. In a March 1993 article, Hoffman
argued that “Israel is attempting to convince the United States that Iranian-inspired
Islamic extremism and Iran’s military rearmament drive have become a major threat to
the stability of the Middle East and the interests of the West.” He noted that, just the
week before, the United States had accused Iran of being the “leading state sponsor of
terrorism.” Israel, he reported, “has the conviction that American public opinion and
political leaders need to be further convinced of the urgency of restraining Iran and that
the US is the only global power capable of doing so.” Israel, he argues, hopes the United
States will “put the brakes on Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and regional hegemony,
saving Israel from a multibillion-dollar weapons program.” He quotes Prime Minister
Rabin, who was then visiting Washington, as saying “Iran is on a mega-maniacal quest to
be a Middle East empire, by using all the varieties of fundamentalist Islam to shake-up
Arab regimes.”
Hoffman quotes a speech Rabin made to the Knesset (Israel’s Legislature)
arguing that “Israel’s struggle against murderous Islamic terror” is “meant to awaken the
world which is lying in slumber.” The American Jewish Committee, Hoffman states,
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recently warned: “we cannot run away or avoid” the possibility that Iran by the end of the
decade may become “the dominant force in the Middle East with the ability to wreak
long-range mass destruction.” He also quotes Benjamin Netanyahu, the opposition frontrunner, as saying “the World Trade Center bombing is not the work of a solitary madman
but a deliberate and systemic organization of murder in the heart of New York City.”22
Parsi gives some more perspective. In his book, Treacherous Alliance, within a
chapter subtitled “The Iranian Threat—Real or Imagined,” Parsi argues that no one
“believed that Iran overnight had turned into a major threat to the region.” Saudi Arabia’s
military spending dwarfed Iran’s. Israel’s military spending also dwarfed Iran’s with
Israel having a population just one-tenth the size. Parsi argues “Iran hadn’t changed;
everyone else had.” Some Israelis agreed, “Israel needs an existential threat.” With Iraq
diminished, Iran was chosen, focusing on Iran’s expanding missile and nuclear
technology. By seeking peace with the Arab states and portraying Iran as a threat, Rabin
and Peres turned the periphery doctrine on its head.23
However, not all political leaders in Israel agreed with the new Israeli policy
toward Iran. Parsi quotes Israeli Chief of Staff Ehud Barak (who served as Labor Party
Prime Minister 1999-2001) as arguing in 1993, “Iran does not pose a threat to Israel at
this time and focusing on Iran is counterproductive.” The desired policy was to
“reinvigorate Israel’s strategic relationship with Washington.” He concluded that the
strategic significance Israel had enjoyed during the Cold War could be regained through
the common threat of Iran and Islamic fundamentalism.24
The key players in the adversarial change toward Iran by Israel were clearly
Yitzhak Rabin and Simon Peres (Labor Party), who assumed power in 1992, along with
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Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu of the opposition Likud right, who were seeking
power. A close look at their speeches, writings, and biographical material can provide
clues regarding this dramatic policy shift. By 1992 the Iranian revolution was already
thirteen years old and Khomeini had passed away in 1989, resulting in a more moderate
leadership assuming power. As previously pointed out, Iran received nuclear reactor
technology from the Carter administration and missile technology from Israel in the late
1970s. Iran’s focus on nuclear arms started to surface only after the death of Khomeini,
who had been opposed to nuclear weapons.
Efraim Inbar, Rabin’s close friend and advisor, wrote a comprehensive 1999
biography titled Rabin and Israel’s National Security. Inbar describes Rabin as Israel’s
longest serving and most important defense minister; his contributions began when he
prepared the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for the 1967 war. Following a near military
disaster in 1973 under Prime Minister Golda Meir, Rabin resumed leadership and was
either defense minister, prime minister, or both until his assassination in 1995. His mantra
never changed: “maximum security constitutes the true peace as only Israel’s military
might guarantees our existence.”25 Although Rabin expressed concern about Iranian
fundamentalism, he was optimistic about Israel’s future.26
Inbar argues that Rabin, as defense minister during the Irangate affair, defended
sending Israeli Hawk missiles to Iran to “open channels of communication to the Islamic
regime and prevent Iraq from gaining an upper hand.” Rabin emphasized Israel badly
needed continued US help to settle the thousands of refugees from the Soviet Union.27 As
ambassador to the United States (1968-1973), Rabin was not tied to the American Jewish
community preferring Israel not be too “dependent on them,” and was critical of AIPAC
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for their support of the Likud party, cautioning AIPAC members “not to be Likudnicks
on his (Rabin’s) watch.”28 Rabin always pushed to maintain Israeli military might,
remarking to Israeli citizens that purchasing US F-15 fighters should be “more important
to Israel than Israelis buying corvettes.”29 Inbar argues that during the last chapter of his
career, Rabin focused on attempts to achieve peace between Israel and its neighbors.30
Inbar argues that, after Oslo, Rabin tried to conclude an Anwar Sadat style of
peace with Syria before his death by agreeing even to Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan
Heights, which Israel had been holding, for guaranteed security. Rabin, he argues, gave
Arafat many concessions at Oslo while “encountering much domestic resistance” but he
felt peace would be “more beneficial to Israel than more territory.”31 The Oslo Accords
had passed the Knesset by only two votes as opposition leader Netanyahu was gaining
strength. Although Rabin was concerned about terrorism, he concluded, “the only way to
dry the swamp of radical Islam is through economic development with an improved
standard of living.”32 In a speech before the Knesset in October 1994, Rabin remarked
“we will confront Khomeinism and peace will not come without security.”33 Peace with
Jordan, he said, was easier than with the Palestinians since “Jordan was a State.”34 Inbar’s
book gives us a perspective on Rabin and his quest for peace toward the end of his life.
Rabin’s foreign minister Shimon Peres (former prime minister and current
president of Israel) wrote his book, The New Middle East, in 1993, giving his insight to
the geopolitical changes of the early 1990s that differs from Rabin’s. Peres argues that
Khomeinism strives to achieve the kingdom of God by “ends that justify the means
including lying, bribing, stealing and murder.” The dangers of nuclear weapons in the
“hands of religious fanatics cannot be exaggerated.”35 He was critical of Israel’s 1982
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“tragic and unnecessary venture into Lebanon blaming the Likud leadership of being
short sighted and stubborn,” leading to the Intifada and the rise of Hezbollah. Peres
argued that Israel took many Jewish refugees from Arab countries and Russia and
therefore the Arabs should step up and “do the same.”36 Peres was Minister of Foreign
Affairs from July 1992 to November 1995 and was clearly more hawkish than Prime
Minister Rabin.
Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister in 1996 (and again in 2009). Some
of his speeches reflect his position. In a speech to the US Congress in 1996 shortly after
being elected, he argued that “peace must include security” and “diplomacy will lead to
peace but terrorism won’t. … Our conflict is with Islamic radicals not that Islam has
replaced communism,” he continued, warning that Iran was a most “dangerous
undemocratic regime and could wed cruel despotism into fanatic militancy.” A nuclear
Iran or Iraq would be catastrophic for Israel, the Middle East and all mankind. “We are
not interested in ‘peace now’ but peace that will last for all time based on democratic
principles.”37
In a speech to the Council of Jewish Federations on November 16, 1997, he
argued: “The Arabs must understand there is no alternative to an all-out war on terrorism.
They must disabuse themselves once and for all of the illusion they can destroy Israel, in
stages, or through an alliance with such regimes as Saddam Hussein or Iran.”38
In a speech to the US Government Reform Committee just after “9/11”
(September 11, 2001), Netanyahu stated, “We have received a wake-up call from hell.”
He asserted that “terrorism cannot exist without sovereign state support” and that Iran,
Iraq, Syria, the Taliban Afghanistan, the PLO, and other Arab regimes are part of the
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“international terrorist network.” Chief among them is Iran and its “Islamic clerical
state.” On nuclear weapons, he argued, “we have the power to crush them now but with
nuclear weapons the equation will fundamentally change.” He concluded that the United
States “must do everything in its power to prevent regimes like Iran and Iraq from
developing nuclear weapons.”39
Speaking before the UN General Assembly in New York eight years later,
Netanyahu described Iran as the “greatest threat that Israel has ever faced. Iran is
Germany with an atomic bomb.”40
Foreign Affairs Minister Ariel Sharon took center stage just after peace talks
sponsored by President Clinton were concluded at Camp David in July 2000.
Negotiations were stuck on the Jerusalem issue. Prime Minister Barak insisted on Israeli
sovereignty over Jerusalem but agreed to Palestinian custodianship over Haram al-Sharif
(Temple Mount). Likud opposition leader Sharon tried to topple Barak from power over
the Temple Mount issue. Sharon had become Likud leader in 1999 and later became
Prime Minister in 2001. Earlier he had been forced to resign as Defense Minister after the
Sabra and Shatila refugee massacres by Lebanese Phalange (Christian) forces in Lebanon
in 1982 while the IDF stood by.
Sharon informed Prime Minister Barak that he intended to “take a public walk on
the Temple-Mount to emphasize his position.” He took the walk on September 26, 2000,
surrounded by hundreds of police. Sharon said to the press, “I came here with a message
of peace; we can live together with the Palestinians. I came here to the holiest place of the
Jewish people in order to see what happens here.” The next day seven Palestinians who
protested Sharon’s walk were killed by Israeli police. This was followed by the
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beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, dooming the peace process. Sharon remarked that the
Palestinian Authority sponsored this “pre-meditated campaign in violation of the Oslo
Accords” and further stated the “Palestinians must recognize the historical right that Jews
have to occupy their capital.”41
The 1996 Likud Party Platform confirms the policies of Netanyahu and Sharon. It
affirms the Israeli control of Jerusalem, claims Jewish settlement and water rights in
Judea and Samaria, and defines the eastern border of Israel. “The Jordan River shall be
the eastern border of the State of Israel; this will be the permanent border between Israel
and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.”42
Not everyone agreed that Iran suddenly became the “new Middle East threat.”
The Clinton Administration (1993-2000) was more focused on Iraq and was not yet
convinced that “Iran overnight had turned into a major threat to the region.”43 By 1993,
“Dual Containment” of both Iran and Iraq became the Clinton policy, though many
Washington insiders did not agree with it.
Former National Security Advisor (NSA) to both presidents Ford and George H.
W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, complained dual containment was a “nutty idea.” Writing a
joint 1997 paper with Zbigniew Brzezinski (President Carter’s NSA) and Richard
Murphy (former ambassador and assistant secretary of state), Scowcroft summarized:
“The US approach should be keeping a straitjacket on Saddam while seeking improved
relations with Iran.”44 The increasing influence of the Likud right in Israel and the Jewish
Lobby in the United States were quickly distancing themselves from the containment idea
and were focused on Iran as an existential threat.
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and left in 1989. The CIA supported the
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mujahedin, the Afghan holy warriors, by supplying many of their weapons—including
stinger anti-aircraft missiles that brought down Soviet helicopter gun-ships. The CIA
helped the Afghan rebels repel the Soviets while achieving a CIA goal of giving the
Soviets “their Vietnam.”45 After the Soviets departed, Taliban fundamentalists, organized
in the southern province of Kandahar, were able to occupy a weakened Afghanistan. The
CIA had no plan for Afghanistan after the Soviets left and just “walked away from it.”
One of the mujahedin fighters was Osama bin Laden; Taliban leader Mullah Omar
invited him to stay in Afghanistan as a guest.46 Bin Laden declared the world of Islam
had “three great threats: Christians, Jews, and Shia.”47 In late 1998 the Taliban executed
eleven Iranian diplomats in northern Afghanistan, nearly causing a full-scale war between
Iran and the Taliban. Iran and the Taliban were not friends.48
Still trying to reach out, in March 1995 President Rafsanjani agreed to give
Conoco, a US oil company, a contract for petroleum exploration in Iran worth one billion
dollars. A mid-rank US state department official approved the deal. The American-Israeli
Political Action Committee (AIPAC) “went into orbit” and pressured President Clinton to
ban all trade with Iran, which he did, making the announcement during a speech before
the World Jewish Congress meeting in March 1995. Secretary Warren Christopher
denounced the Conoco deal, stating it would “put money into the evil hand of Iran.”49
The game was about to change. The United States left the alliance with Iran when
the hostages were taken during the Islamic Revolution, even though Iran elected more
moderate leadership after Khomeini died. Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami reached out
to the United States many times, starting during the First Gulf War, and responded to
President George H. W. Bush’s goodwill gestures with help getting the final hostages
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released from Lebanon. As we will see, Iran reached out again when the United Stated
invaded Afghanistan after 9/11, offering to help defeat the Taliban plus proposing a
Grand Bargain to negotiate political differences.
Iran was rebuffed and humiliated by not being included in either Madrid or Oslo
political agreements, though both conferences involved all their neighbors. Still hoping to
preserve a relationship with Iran, Israel hung on to the alliance a little longer, dealing
with Iran for oil and sending Iran arms during the Iran-Iraq war. Now the tide in Israel
was turning against Iran, after Netanyahu and Sharon came to power from the Israeli
right. The powerful Israeli lobby in the United States, the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC), would help facilitate that change.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ISRAELI LOBBY, IRANOPHOBIA, AND THE BOMB
The Israeli lobby in the United States has always played a major role promoting a
pro-Israeli policy within the United States government, as their mission is to help insure
the survival of the state of Israel. As AIPAC’s Idaho state chair and member of AIPAC’s
national council, Skip Oppenheimer argues that, while AIPAC has considerable influence
in Washington, it doesn’t determine Israel’s policy and all sides of issues are represented
on the council.1 As previously discussed, the Jewish lobby in the United States was key
in helping convince President Truman to support the UN plan to partition Palestine in
1947 and recognize the State of Israel in 1948, and has successively continued to promote
Israel’s case ever since. The strong United States-Israel-Iran alliance that began shortly
after Israel became a state continued until the Islamic Revolution. Iran again turned to
Israel when it needed US arms in order to halt the Iraqi invasion in 1980. Then, in the
early 1990s, Israel’s relationship with Iran changed abruptly. Fearing the loss of US
support through the strategic alliance that had been formed to counter Soviet expansion
and Arab hostility, Israel decided Iran was to be the new common enemy as those threats
diminished. Israel just had to convince the United States that Iran was becoming an actual
threat. AIPAC supported that transformation and began promoting the idea of Iran as the
new common enemy of Israel and the United States.
AIPAC began advancing the policies outlined by David Hoffman in the last
chapter, arguing that Iranian inspired Islamic terrorism and Iran’s military build-up has
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become a major threat to the stability of the Middle East and the West. As Parsi argues,
AIPAC is the “King of Lobbies.” Their job is to keep the United States “engaged in
supporting Israel financially, militarily and politically. Following the assassination of
Prime Minister Rabin and the unraveling of the Oslo Accords, Israel’s Likud party came
to power, was determined to expand into the West Bank and work toward regional
hegemony and security.”2
Sensing a move toward US accommodation with Iran, AIPAC continued to be
engaged in promoting Israel as the reliable United States ally and Iran as a radical Islamic
state. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a fellow lobby allied with
many United States neoconservatives (neocons) on its board, had been supporting “using
American economic and military power to bring liberalism, democracy and human rights
to other countries.”3 As Joel Benin argues, many WINEP Board members ended up in the
George W. Bush administration.4
In their provocative and controversial book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign
Policy, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt detail the tremendous influence AIPAC has
in Washington to promote Israeli foreign policy. Mearsheimer and Walt argue, “There is
no lobby that matches AIPAC; they are in a class by themselves.” They and the
neoconservatives began to “extol the virtues of American hegemony by spreading
democracy and preserving US dominance as the best route to long-term peace.” AIPAC
favored a combination of “unilateral exercise of American power with its hawkish
ideology.” AIPAC, they add, collaborates with another powerful lobby, the Christian
Zionists, a subset of the Christian Right, who are equally dogmatic in their beliefs on the
return of the Jews to Palestine. This, the Christian Zionists believe, is a “preordained
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process that will lead to the Second Coming” (of Christ). An example: The Christians
United for Israel organization claims to have millions of followers in the United States.5
Mearsheimer and Walt’s book on AIPAC’s powerful political influence got a lot
of attention from the Jewish community, who came down hard on the authors. Ed
Pilkington, writing in The Guardian Unlimited, describes how Mearsheimer and Walt
were assailed in the Washington Post as anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish. He cites op-eds by
William Kristol and Alan Dershowitz in the Wall Street Journal calling the book a
“bigoted attack on the Jewish community.” Mearsheimer and Walt have been compared
with white supremacist David Duke.6
Mearsheimer and Walt argue that well over half of the US House of
Representatives “do reflexively whatever AIPAC wants.”7 They report that as of 2005,
Israel has received over $154 billion in direct economic and military assistance from the
United States (not counting private donations from US citizens, that are tax-deductible)
and argue the United States has vetoed 42 UN Security Council resolutions critical of
Israel.8
One example is when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982; President Reagan and
Secretary of State George Schultz opposed a precipitous $250 million increase in military
assistance to Israel, sponsored by the US House of Representatives. Mearsheimer and
Walt quoted Secretary Schultz: “The supplement sailed right by us and was approved by
Congress as though President Reagan and I had not even been there. This brought home
to me, vividly, Israel’s leverage in our Congress.”9 When former Secretary of State
Schultz wrote the forward to Abraham Foxman’s recent book The Deadliest Lies: The
Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control, he emphasized that the Israeli lobby has a
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right to try and influence US policy and the US government is responsible for the policies
it adopts.10
A few close-to-home examples of AIPAC’s influence include observations by
Idaho’s senator Jim McClure (US Senate 1973-1991). Senator McClure observed firsthand the powerful influence AIPAC had on Congress. McClure stated that AIPAC is one
of the most powerful lobbies in Washington, explaining, “AIPAC assigned a personal
lobbyist to me who visited my office every week. Even though, with my strong support in
Idaho, they knew they could not influence my re-election campaigns, they were relentless
in expressing their views.”11 One of McClure’s biographers, Dr. Wilma Woods-Davis,
argues in her Ph.D. thesis “Portrait of a Pragmatic Conservative,” that McClure was
neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israeli, but McClure did remind his fellow senators there was an
“Arab Side.”12
In 1986, when former Idaho Governor John Evans campaigned to unseat Senator
Steve Symms, he needed to raise out-of-state money for the race. Evans was told to
contact AIPAC. AIPAC explained they were not a PAC (political action committee) that
gives money to candidates but they could put him in contact with Jewish PACs “all over
the country,” which they did. He raised over $200,000 from Jewish PACs for his
unsuccessful race against Symms.13
Boise pediatrician Dr. David Peterman became involved with AIPAC in 1990
when he helped raise Jewish PAC campaign money for former Idaho State Senator Ron
Twilegar. Twilegar ran an unsuccessful campaign against Congressman Larry Craig for
retiring Senator Jim McClure’s senatorial seat. Peterman agrees with the influence
AIPAC has on political races.14
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Harry Lonsdale ran against Oregon’s Senator Mark Hatfield, also in 1990.
Lonsdale was pro-Israel and when meeting with AIPAC in Washington, he was quizzed
regarding his opinion on various Middle East subjects. To gain their support, in the final
analysis he was told what his opinion “must” be and the “exact words he was to use to
express those opinions in public.”15
US media began to heed the new mantra from AIPAC and WINEP regarding the
threat to Israel from Iran. Clyde Haberman, writing his column for the New York Times in
November 1992, gave the new Clinton administration some foreign policy advice from
Israel: “Watch out for Iran.” Iran, not Iraq, is the “bigger threat in the Middle East.”16
Donald Neff, writing in 1996 for the Washington Report on the Middle East
Affairs, agrees, “It was three years ago that the media in Israel and Israel’s supporters in
the United States began a coordinated campaign to enlist America into an alliance against
Iran.” The effort has been so successful that today, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
considers Iran as “public enemy No. 1.” Neff quotes former Ambassador Andrew I.
Killgore as saying, “Bill Clinton believes he cannot be re-elected without media and
financial support from the Israeli lobby.” Clinton and Secretary Christopher “buy Israeli
exaggerations of dangers from Iran, whether they really believe them or not.” Neff
argues, “Israel is calling the shots in Washington.”17
Groups in the lobby also attempted to marginalize those who criticized Israeli
policy. For example, after former President Jimmy Carter published his book, Palestine:
Peace not Apartheid in November 2006, he was labeled “anti-Israel” and an “antiSemite” in editorials and ads taken out in prominent newspapers. Carter argues, “few
newspapers including the New York Times, Washington Post or the Wall Street Journal
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ever support the Palestinian side.” The “US media is pretty well controlled by AIPAC.”
Some universities, he argues, are threatened if they hire non-pro-Israeli faculty.18 Longtime Carter Center Fellow and former Carter Center Executive Director, Kenneth Stein,
resigned in protest a few days after Carter’s book was published although he did not
dispute any accuracy in it.19
Michael B. Owen’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in December 2006
denounced Carter’s book, arguing Carter “seems to have a religious problem with the
Jewish State.” Owen states he has a problem with Carter who claims to be a “full time
Christian,” when he doesn’t agree with previous presidents like Lincoln, Wilson, and
Truman who favored “restoring Jews to their homeland.”20
In the same issue of the WSJ, Ali Abunimah rebutted Owen in an op-ed titled
“And a Palestinian One.” Abunimah argued that Carter has done “what few American
politicians have dared to do: speak frankly about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
Abunimah agrees with the conclusion that there has been unequal treatment of
Palestinians by the Israel government. Abunimah further states Carter has “done the
United States an enormous service.”21
Joel Beinin, writing in Le Monde Diplomatique, argues that WINEP “concentrates
on influencing the media and executive branch” while AIPAC “targets Congress.”
Founded in 1985, WINEP was at first just “friendly to Israel” and doing “credible
research on the Middle East.” Following Oslo and during the 1990s they also
concentrated on maintaining US pro-Israel Middle East policy. WINEP promoted Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s view that Israel was a reliable US ally against radical
Islam. Iran, WINEP claims, is the “new enemy in the post-Cold War world order.” Beinin
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argues WINEP affiliates “colonized” the Clinton and, especially, the George W. Bush
administrations and that “WINEP has also drifted toward the Israeli right.”22
Responding to AIPAC pressure, Senator Alphonse D’Amato was successful in
getting his bill, The Libya Sanctions Act, passed in 1996, effectively eliminating all US
trade with Iran. It then passed in the US House of Representatives by 415 to 0 votes even
though the Clinton administration lobbied against the bill.23
The Clinton Administration was criticized for not doing anything about terrorism pre
9/11. A list of anti-terrorism measures introduced during the Clinton administration—most
of which were introduced in congress but never acted on—is provided on the cdt.org
website.24 Following Rabin’s assassination a new round of Iranian and Israeli statements,
each calling the other group “terrorists,” emerged.
In his recent book The Arab Lobby, Mitchell Bard argues the Arabs, too, have
always had a powerful US lobby. He attempts to diminish the Mearsheimer and Walt
book, calling the authors “racist and paternalistic as they attempt to portray the Arabs as
impotent.” Saudi Arabia, the main Arab lobby supporter, Bard argues, “seeks to influence
US Middle East policy.”25 He diminishes Carter’s book by arguing “President Carter
received the smallest proportion of the Jewish vote since 1924 because his policies were
viewed as a threat to Israel’s security.”26
Benjamin Netanyahu defeated Peres and became prime minister of Israel in 1996
and was able to influence AIPAC’s shift to the right. Parsi argues this marked a
“beginning of the end of the Oslo Accords.” The new dividing line was “those within the
Oslo process and those outside of it.” Abiding by the Oslo Accords would be the end of
Israeli expansion into the West Bank unless there were further land swap negotiations.
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Iran feared peace with the Palestinians would lead to peace with Syria, turning the Arab
world in Israel’s favor and leaving Iran more isolated. Iran began to support Hamas to
undermine Oslo.27
In a speech to a joint session of the US Congress on July 10, 1996, Prime Minister
Netanyahu said, “we do not have a quarrel with Islam nor do we believe in the inevitable
clash of civilizations.”28 Netanyahu continued, “Democracy is promoted but not if it
brings Islamic Fundamentalism to power. We do not believe that Islam has replaced
Communism as the new rival of the West. Our quarrel is with the militant fanatics.” He
identified Iran as “the most dangerous regime.” He made the case that Jerusalem would
always remain under Israeli control, and why it must be that way.29
Former President Jimmy Carter, in his book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid,
argues that Netanyahu, on becoming prime minister of Israel, “promised never to
exchange land for peace.” Netanyahu’s foreign minister Ariel Sharon declared the Oslo
Agreement to be “national suicide.” Sharon told his countrymen, “Everybody has to
move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because
everything we take now will be ours—everything we don’t grab will go to them.”30
Dr. David Peterman argues that AIPAC began to “turn right” when it eased
Thomas Dine, long-time executive director (1980-1993) and a moderate, out of AIPAC.
“AIPAC began to embrace the anti-Iranian rhetoric coming from Jerusalem.”31 According
to M. J. Rosenberg, AIPAC’s current executive director Howard Kohr “is a conservative
Republican who was hired largely because of his personal and political closeness to Newt
Gingrich. In the Israeli context Dine was Labor and Kohr is Likud.” Dine, Rosenberg
argues, “was fired in the early 1990s by a very right-wing (AIPAC) board having decided
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it wanted a Republican executive director.” Rosenberg also remarks that AIPAC “gets its
direction from a foreign government [Israel].”32
Thomas Dine was on the staff of the US Senate Special Committee on National
Emergencies in 1973 and 1974, and worked closely with Idaho’s Senator Frank Church.
Bethine Church, widow of Senator Church (who died in 1984), remembers Dine well,
trusted him, and agreed AIPAC became more “Likud-like” after he left. She remained
friends with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. They invited her back to Jerusalem in June
1995 to receive the “Jerusalem Apple Award.” She relates being upset then by the
“troublemaker” Netanyahu, as she did not like his “rejection of Oslo policies,” and never
“trusted him.” She blames Netanyahu for inciting hostility toward Rabin, leading to his
assassination. Bethine was a member of AIPAC before Senator Church died but resigned
in the early 1990s. Ms. Church was pleased when the moderate Mohammad Khatami
assumed power in Iran in 1997 and considered him a “straight-shooter.”33
Seyed Mohammad Khatami was elected as Iranian president May 23, 1997. A
moderate who would try to improve relations with the rest of the world, he would follow
the lead of his predecessor Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Khatami and Rafsanjani are
referred to as “the reformists.” Relations between Iran and the Arabs were starting to
improve, leading to Iran’s formation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).
Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, addressing the first conference in
Tehran, praised Iran for their “invaluable contributions throughout our glorious Islamic
history.” He praised Khatami’s effort to “consecrate the spirit of solidarity and
interdependence.” He warned against attempts at hegemony and the use of “violence to
create an Islamic state.”34
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CNN reporter Christianne Amanpour interviewed President Khatami on January
7, 1998. In the interview, Khatami argued that “over the past two centuries the Iranian
nation has been humiliated as its fate was decided by others,” the last time being when
the Shah “capitulated,” making American advisors “immune from prosecution in Iran.”
Khatami explained that the Iranian hostage incident had been due to “revolutionary
fervor” for which he apologized. He argued that since the fall of Communism, Islam has
been declared by some as the “new enemy.”35
During the Rafsanjani and Khatami years there were signs of improving relations
between Iran and the West and also with Iran and their Arab neighbors. However, there
was the problem of Iran’s support of Hezbollah, a “terrorist” group in Lebanon.
Hezbollah, an organization of “Shi’ite extremists,” came into existence in Lebanon
following Israel’s brutal invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Keddie explains that Hezbollah
(The Party of God) started in Iran as a violent arm of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP).36
Weiner, in Legacy of Ashes, argues Hezbollah in Iran was raising money and obtaining
explosives to forward Khomeini’s messianic vision of “conquering Iraq, seizing the holy
shrine of Karbala and marching on Jerusalem.”37
In his book Hizbollah: the Story From Within, Naim Qassem (Hezbollah’s Deputy
Secretary General) argues that Hezbollah rose up following the intense destruction of
Lebanon and the killing of civilians by the Israeli military and the “horrifying massacres
at the Sabra and Shantila Palestinian refugee camps” by the Israelis and Phalangist
(Christian) forces. Hezbollah rose up from the Lebanese Shi’ite resistance fighters and
was later supported by Iran. Qassem claims Hezbollah will eventually be more active in
Lebanon’s political process when the occupiers leave.38 Hala Jaber, in his book
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Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, agrees that Hezbollah will exist until Israel no longer
is an “occupier” of Palestinian land.39
Dr. Ronen Bergman, a long-time Israeli security and intelligence correspondent
for the Tel-Aviv newspaper Yedith Abronoth, is considered an authority on Israeli
intelligence. In Bergman’s recently published book The Secret War with Iran, he
discusses the origin of Hezbollah and the Iranian involvement with the organization. He
argues the “Shi’ites in Iran and the Shi’ites in Lebanon have always been linked.” Mussa
al-Sadr, who in 1975 founded Amal, a political/social organization in Lebanon, came
from Iran. Al-Sadr’s niece married Khomeini’s son and Amal received assistance from
the shah through SAVAK. Al-Sadr disappeared in 1978 on a trip to Libya. His deputy,
Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, became Hezbollah’s supreme spiritual authority in
Lebanon and remains so today. Some members of Amal joined Hezbollah; Amal still
remains a political party in Lebanon. Bergman argues, “It is hard to believe that Israel
and the West failed to foresee the birth of Hezbollah.”40
September 11, 2001, was not an attack on the United States by Shia radicals in
Iran but by Sunni extremists from Saudi Arabia. The US response was to invade
Afghanistan in order to remove the Taliban who harbored al-Qaeda, who in turn trained
the terrorists. Iran was a “bitter enemy of the Taliban” and was willing to help defeat
them, assisting the US-led coalition. Iran had previously armed and trained the Northern
Alliance and was willing to continue that effort. The United States began secret meetings
with Iran in Geneva initiated by Ambassador James Dobbins, President Bush’s special
envoy to Afghanistan.41 In his recent book The Twilight War, David Crist details the
negotiations between the Iranian and US delegations meeting in Geneva after the
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September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. The “Iranians made it clear they wanted
to support the United States in Afghanistan. Iran offered its airfields, also offered to
continue to train the Northern Alliance, and agreed to help form a post-Taliban
government in Kabul with the Northern Alliance as the nucleus.”42
Gareth Porter, writing for the Inter Press Service (IPS), argued that the United
States and Iran were on course to “work closely together in the war against al-Qaeda and
its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002.” The cooperation
proposal, Porter argues, was “scuttled by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.” It was
the Northern Alliance troops, supported by Iran, that drove the Taliban out of Kabul by
mid-November.43
Parsi argues that Iran offered the United States use of its air bases and was
instrumental at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 to get the Northern Alliance to
agree to a coalition government for Afghanistan. Iran was the largest donor, pledging
$500 million in assistance for Afghanistan (more than any other country including the
United States). Iran even offered to train and equip another 20,000 Northern Alliance
troops in Afghanistan.44 Instead of embracing Iran’s gestures, pressure was put on
President Bush to include Iran in his “Axis of Evil” speech in January 2002. Israelis
feared the United States cooperating with Iran would threaten them and weaken their
relationship with the US. Israel quickly labeled all their adversaries terrorists.
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, interim charge’ d’affaires to the new government in
Afghanistan in 2002, gave the keynote speech at the Frank Church Institute Conference
on Afghanistan in Boise on October 16, 2012. Crocker argued that Iran was indeed antiTaliban and was supportive of the US effort to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. He
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confirmed Iran’s leadership role at the Bonn Conference and their support of the new
Karzai government. “The dialogue stopped,” he argued, “when President Bush gave his
‘Axis of Evil’ speech. The United States lost a strategic opportunity.”45
The “Axis of Evil” speech by President Bush came after the interception by the
Israel navy of the Karin A, a ship allegedly from Iran filled with arms for the
Palestinians, that was captured by Israel in the Red Sea in January 2002. This incident
ended Washington’s efforts to continue a dialogue with Iran. The Khatami government
denied any involvement with the affair but had lost credibility. Some claim the Karin A
incident was a hoax, trumped up by Israel.46 Bergman disagrees, arguing the Karin A was
dispatched by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and “the ship contained a large number of
arms that would have made a significant difference in supplying Palestinian terrorist
groups.”47
James Bennett quoted a speech by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon saying that
cooperation with Iran risked “appeasing Arab nations the way European democracies
appeased Hitler on the eve of World War II.” Sharon went on “Don’t repeat the terrible
mistakes of 1938, when the enlightened democracies in Europe decided to sacrifice
Czechoslovakia for a comfortable, temporary solution. [Israel] will not be
Czechoslovakia.” Mr. Sharon concluded: “We can depend only on ourselves.”48
Bette Stockbauer, writing for the Information Clearing House in a piece titled
“Rebuilding America’s Defenses – a Summary: Blueprint of the PNAC Plan for U.S.
Global Hegemony,” argued that a Washington think tank, Project for the New American
Century (PNAC), was founded by neoconservative William Kristol, with a board that
included Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby, and Richard
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Perle. PNAC began outlining a new US strategy for the Middle East back in 1997. Their
policy targeted a pre-emptive strike against Saddam Hussein, in order to accomplish a
regime change, as the number one priority. PNAC, Stockbauer continues, has a
“philosophy that was formed in response to the ending of Cold War hostilities and the
emergence of the United States as the only preeminent superpower.” Stockbauer claims
that this is a “strategic movement that should not be squandered” and that America
should use its position and power to establish democracies to replace regimes “considered
hostile to US interests” and should use all means “including military” to achieve those
ends. 49
Neil Mackay wrote in Scotland’s The Sunday Herald in September 2002 arguing
that the PNAC blueprint called for regime change in Iran, Libya, Syria, and North Korea.
After the event of the terrorist attacks on the US on 9/11, Wolfowitz and Cheney “were
calling for an invasion of Iraq” before anyone knew who was responsible. Afghanistan,
Iran, and Syria were also considered to be threats and should also be dealt with next.50
Parsi argues that the pro-Israeli lobby had helped push the Bush administration into
invading Iraq. PNAC labeled Iran the “bigger threat” but Iraq to be dealt with first, then
Iran to follow “the day after Iraq was crushed.”51
After the quick defeat of Iraq in May 2003, a Newsday report by Gregory Beals
revealed that Iran sent a proposal through the Swiss ambassador in Tehran to be
forwarded to the US. The proposal allegedly had the approval of both Ayatollah
Khamanei and President Khatami and asked for “mutual respect, a halt to hostile
behavior, [and] abolishment of sanctions on Iran” in exchange for their support of a
democratic government in Iraq. They were open to “put on the table” access to inspect
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Iran’s peaceful nuclear technology.52 Iran wanted members of the Iranian terrorist
organization based in Iraq, the Mujaedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), handed over to
them by Iraq in return for the al-Qaeda operatives the Iranians held. The Iranians would
also agree to end their support of Hezbollah and the Islamaic Jihad. Iran would even
agree to honor the Arab League’s 2002 proposal recognizing Israel via the 1967 borders
and a two-state solution. An article written in the New York Times by Nicholas Kristof
also supports the Grand Bargain proposal.53
In his recent book The Twilight War, David Crist details the May 4, 2003, “Grand
Bargain” initiative by Iran through the Swiss foreign ministry involving the Swiss
ambassador to Iran Tim Guldimann. The Iranian ambassador to France, Sadeq Kharrazi,
worked with President Khatami on the proposal, who related, “We are ready to normalize
relations [with the United States].”54 UN ambassador John Bolton was adamant about not
talking to Iran and helped persuade Secretary Colin Powell and his assistant Richard
Armitage that Swiss ambassador Guldimann had “gilded the lily” and that it was not a
serious proposal so there was no need for a US response.55
Another confirmation of the Beals article in Newsday and the response by the
United States was argued by Gareth Porter in a March 26, 2006 article in IPS. He asserted
the neoconservative secret “cabal,” led by Vice President Dick Cheney in Washington,
blocked Iran’s 2003 “Grand Bargain” initiative. This ended direct diplomatic contacts
between Iran and the United States. Iran viewed the negative response as another
“humiliation,” along with the previous rebuffs to their overtures at Madrid and Oslo and
to their offer to help defeat the Taliban.56
Some concluded there was not a legitimate “Grand Bargain” offer by Iran.
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Stephen Rosen argues in the American Thinker that Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage told PBS Frontline that he and Secretary Powell were “very interested” in the
opening to an Iran proposal but neither thought the message they received in May 2003
was a “serious endeavor.” Armitage later admitted that if he had known Iran’s
ambassador to the UN, Javad Zarif, had been involved he would have “taken the proposal
far more seriously.”57
Marc Perelman, writing in the Jewish Daily Forward, argued that US and Israeli
hawks were leading the charge for invading Iran while Gary Sick, director of Middle East
Studies at Columbia University, was advocating “engaging Iran.”58
Israel invaded Lebanon again on July 12, 2006, following an incident involving
the killing of three Israeli soldiers and the capture of two more by Hezbollah. Israel once
more destroyed much of Lebanon’s infrastructure, hoping to destroy Hezbollah’s
resources. Matt M. Matthews of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) argues that the
“stalemate for Israel confounded military analysts around the world.” The IDF had been
considered the most powerful army in the Middle East and had “emerged from the
campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished.”59
Nawaf Obaid, managing director of the Saudi National Security Project (SUSRIS)
and critical of Hezbollah, had pushed Bush to pressure Israel for an early cease-fire after
their “ridiculous onslaught” into Lebanon. President Bush did not immediately respond.
(Amazingly, Bush did not call on Israel for a cease-fire until more than a month after the
invasion.)60
Meanwhile, clandestine relations and trade between Israel and Iran continued.
Stanley A. Weiss’ 2010 article in the International Harold Tribune, “Israel and Iran, The
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Bonds That Tie Persians and Jews,” argued “ancient cultural bonds and common strategic
interests between the Persians and Jews made Iran and Israel close allies.” During
Khatami’s reformist presidency, Israel was exporting agricultural equipment to Iran to
pay “shah-era oil debts to Iran.” Weiss quotes Benjamin Disraeli [Weiss misquoted, the
quote was actually made by former British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston] as saying
“nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests”
which will, in time, make “Persian Iran and Jewish Israel, now enemies, friends again.”61
The trade continues.
In an April 4, 2008 article in the Guardian, Richard Silverstein agrees there is still
trade between Iran and Israel despite an “ironclad boycott of all things Iranian” being
observed by Israel. Citing a recent multi-billion-euro contract for Iran to supply
Switzerland with natural gas, Swiss sources reveal Israel has been “buying Iranian oil for
years.” The oil goes to Rotterdam and then to Haifa in Israel, imported by the EilatAshkelon Pipeline Co., which doesn’t disclose its sources. The Iranian oil is of the
“higher quality” preferred by Israel. Silverstein uses the term “hypocrisy” in his article.62
B. Joffe-Walt, writing in Arab News on January 19, 2010, also confirms there is
currently trade between Israel and Iran. “An Israeli IT company has admitted to selling
an on-line business management system to the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.” The
million-dollar deal was signed at the company’s Belgium headquarters. Trade between
Iran and Israel is “illegal in both countries.”63
Another recent article in The Wall Street Journal by Charles Levinson recounts
the use of Iranian marble in Israeli buildings. The “high-ceiling lobby and stately
exterior” of the new headquarters of Bank Leumi (a partly state-owned Israeli lender) are
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swathed in thousands of square feet of Gohara stone. This marble is found only in Iran
and is transported through Turkey where it is re-packaged and shipped to Israel. Gohara
marble also adorns the new Conference Center near Ben-Gurion airport.64
According to AIPAC, the greatest contention between Iran and Israel in the last
twenty years is the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear bomb. (Israel reportedly has
over 200 nuclear bombs including two Dolphin class submarines carrying nuclear
missiles.) The other major issue is the threat to Israel from Hezbollah (and Hamas). The
2006 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, attempting to marginalize Hezbollah, failed. Israel
again destroyed roads, bridges, and airfields throughout Lebanon but could not defeat
Hezbollah. Since the end of the war Hezbollah has re-armed. The cover article in The
Economist issue of January 1, 2011 reports, “Iran and Syria have provided Hezbollah
with an arsenal of perhaps 50,000 missiles and rockets, many with ranges and payloads
well beyond what Hezbollah had last time.” The article concludes that Iran “has the
desire to acquire nuclear weapons at any cost and Israel’s desire is to stop Iran at any
cost.” From this a “war might arise.”65
AIPAC describes Iran as “a leading sponsor of international terrorism,” and says
“a nuclear-armed Iran would pose unacceptable threats to the United States and its
allies.” They recommend stronger sanctions, for now. AIPAC’s analysis of the possibility
of a nuclear Iran is that “a nuclear-armed Iran would constitute an existential threat to
Israel, but would not threaten Israel only.” Iran, they argue, has also been conducting
research and tests on technologies needed to deliver a nuclear weapon, including the
rapid advancement of its long-range ballistic missile and space program. They conclude
“a nuclear Iran would destabilize the world by leading to nuclear proliferation in the
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region and alter the strategic balance of the Middle East.”66
Not everyone agrees with AIPAC’s analysis. In his recent book, Iranophobia: The
Logic of an Israeli Obsession, Haggai Ram disagrees. Ram reflects that Iran was the
Jewish state’s former intimate ally and today its most bitter foe. He compares the
similarity of Iranian Islamic revolution to the history of Zionism.67 Israel, he argues,
shipped about “five hundred million dollars of arms to Iran each year during the
1970s.”68 He argues that following Camp David and peace with Egypt, which were
followed by the Gulf war, then the Oslo agreement, Israel “needed to relocate the image
of the diminished threat from the Arab vicinity. Israel turned to another source: the
Persian periphery, even though as late as the 1980s no one even mentioned Iran as a
threat.” He asserts that Israel is dependent on the drug of militarism and thereby the
continuation of an existential enemy.69
Hezbollah and Hamas, Ram maintains, are not “manufactured banalities like alQaeda but are grass-root movements; a political manifestation of the historically denied
and politically repressed.” Both groups were comprised of resistance fighters who
organized to combat Israeli aggression in Lebanon and Gaza.70
Ram argues that Israel seized on Bush’s antiterrorist agenda following 9/11 and
escalated the rhetoric of the threat of Palestinian and Lebanese (Hamas and Hezbollah)
terrorists by using the tactic of “dehumanizing” them. Ram explains the far right
followers in Israel are “Iran-like” in their religious and ethnic beliefs. Ram suggests:
With a nuclear Israel and a nuclear United States (plus Iran’s nuclear neighbors India,
Pakistan, China, and Russia), an Iran leader not pursuing nuclear technology should be
considered a madman, “not the other way around.”71 Ram portrays the “presumed
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apocalypse in Iran” as “irrational.”72
Fellow Israeli academic Benny Morris sees it differently. In an editorial published
in the New York Sun titled “The Second Holocaust,” Morris describes the Nazi Holocaust
as “one-to-one” contact with the victims. This time, he argues, it will be different, since
“nuclear-tipped Shihab III and IV missiles will wipe out the Israeli population”
(including the 3.5 million Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza and 1.3 million Arabs living
in Israel, nearly all Sunnis). This holocaust, he argues, will occur because of a “supreme
divine command” with the martyrs serving a “noble cause.” He thinks the West will “do
nothing” to prevent it just like they did nothing before and it will be all over for Israel in
“a few minutes.”73
Iranophobia is the official party line of many Israeli officials. In an address to the
United Nations on October 1, 2007, Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni declared
“No responsible state disagrees that Iran is the most prominent sponsor of terrorism. It is
a major source of instability and conflict in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine and across the
entire Middle East and it is the enemy of Arab-Israeli co-existence.” She challenged the
UN and the world to live up to the promise of “never again.”74
Yet the same Tzipi Livni commented, in a series of closed discussions a few
weeks later, that in her opinion “Iranian nuclear weapons do not pose an existential threat
to Israel.” The Haaretz article also discloses: “This same opinion was also expressed by
former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy.”75
Many in Israel call for military action. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat
Center for Strategic Studies, recently argued that “diplomacy has run its course” and that
“only military action can stop Iran’s race for nuclear arms.” Tehran with nuclear arms
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“will destabilize the Middle East, by having a chain effect leading to further nuclear
proliferation.”76
Elliott Abrams, President George W. Bush’s deputy national security advisor,
recently weighed in on the AIPAC side in a Wall Street Journal op-ed. titled “Why Israel
is Nervous.” Abrams argues that over 80% of US Jewish voters cast ballots for President
Obama in 2008. He recounts that relations between US presidents and Israel have been
mixed, starting with Truman who defied Secretary Marshall by supporting a Jewish state.
President Johnson was the first president to send Israel serious arms (fighter jets). Then
Nixon became more involved, warning the Soviets not to interfere in the 1973 war while
airlifting massive arms shipments when Israel faced losing that war.
Abrams examines the position of recent presidents, stating “There is no love lost
between Israel and President Carter especially after his ‘hostile’ book on Palestinian
Apartheid.” He indicates Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton had “mixed”
relations and that President George W. Bush was “closer” to Israel during their joint “war
on terror.” Abrams argues that President Obama’s popularity in Israel dropped
considerably when Obama favored Tzipi Livni in the last election and pushed Israel to
stop West Bank settlement expansion after Netanyahu formed a government. Abrams
asserts the “military option” must be kept on the table in dealing with Iran’s nuclear
initiative. Israel believes, he says, the only thing worse than bombing Iran is Iran having a
nuclear bomb, but this, he argues is “not the Obama view.” He contends Israeli
construction in the West Bank provides jobs for Palestinians and new construction takes
place only “inside already existing Israeli communities.” Some Israelis feel the current
Obama administration offer of engaging Iran is “unrealistic, even naïve” and should be
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more “realistic.”77
Admiral Mike Mullen, speaking in Boise in April 2011, agrees that Iran having
the bomb would be “catastrophic” for the region, as it would stimulate other countries in
the Middle East to follow, resulting in further instability.78
Parsi summarizes: “Iran hadn’t changed, everyone else had.” Israel focused on
Iran “because all other previous threats had more or less evaporated. There were simply
no other conventional military threats left.” Israel needed to “reinvigorate its strategic
relationship with the United States. After Iraq’s defeat Iran could be seen as a threat for
the future.”79
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Wendy Hansen, writing for the Los Angeles Times, reported on Judean date palm
tree seeds found thirty years ago during an archeological excavation at the Masada.
Carbon dating showed them to be approximately 2000 years old; about the time of the
Roman siege of the Masada in 73 C.E. Some of the seeds were recently planted and have
grown to seedlings that are now over four feet tall. Similarly, a 1,300-year-old Chinese
lotus, after being dormant for over a century, is able to emerge and grow under new
conditions.1
Like those of rare desert trees, the seeds of Zionism and Iranian nationalism were
sown in the ancient Middle East, sprouted and grew, then became dormant during
centuries of wars, oppression, and religious strife. These seedlings have recently been
nourished both by the quest for a homeland for the Jews, intensified by the Holocaust,
and the emergence of Iranian nationalism, with a quest for democracy. Both nations have
struggled to flourish following a break in the clouds, as suppressive empires collapsed
around them in the early years of the twentieth century. Although Zionism and Iranian
nationalism are still struggling in the midst of Arab Sunni populations, they have been
fertilized by a chance for revival; for this could be their time in the sun.
Persians and Jews had their first encounter in the sixth century BCE when Cyrus
conquered the Babylonians as the Achemenian Dynasty expanded to become the world’s
greatest empire. Cyrus allowed the Jews, who previously had been enslaved by the
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Babylonians, to return to Judea where they built their temple with Jerusalem as their
capital. During their captivity in Babylonia, they encountered the teachings of Zoroaster,
the Persian priest who taught monotheism and justice for all. Monotheism had already
been introduced to the Jews by Abraham as part of his covenant with God, according to
the Jewish Bible, but had not yet been totally accepted.
Following their return to Israel the Jews achieved prosperity and superiority over
their neighbors. The Roman Empire eventually disrupted their hegemony in the second
century CE and forced them once again into diaspora that would last for nearly two
thousand years. The Jews maintained their Jewish culture in countries to which they fled.
Many settled in Iran where they were generally well treated. Many Jews have always
wanted to return home and reclaim their kingdom and their capital Jerusalem. Other Jews
chose to stay in Arab countries and Iran rather than return to Judea.
The horrible European pogroms in the nineteenth century and the Holocaust in
Europe under the Nazis made it clear that the Jews, in order to survive, would have to
have their own nation and start defending themselves from then on. The “Return to Zion”
immigration finally gave the Jews sufficient population for Israel to become a state
following World War II. The United States, with its large, influential, and politicallyactive Jewish population, would become their critical benefactor. It wasn’t going to be
easy, but this time they had to do whatever it took to stay together and survive as a state;
“never again” meant to them “never again.”
Israel was immediately attacked by most of their Arab neighbors after declaring
their new state in 1948. After the 1948-1949 war, Israel began reaching out to countries
in the periphery of their Arab enemies. Iran, with historic and cultural ties to Israel, had
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oil critical to Israel’s existence and was not hostile to the new Jewish state. There is clear
evidence from my research that Israel and Iran had a strong and robust alliance during
that time. Israel needed oil and Iran needed Israeli expertise in technical and agricultural
areas (as well as arms) to rebuild their shattered economy, making their alliance mutually
beneficial. Although becoming Israel’s most important Middle Eastern ally, Iran wanted
their relationship to be secretive so as to avoid acrimony from their Muslim neighbors.
Iran and Israel jointly built a pipeline across Israel to ship Iranian oil to the
Mediterranean, avoiding the Suez Canal. Israel has since received Iranian oil almost
continually, with brief interruptions, to the present time. Israel provided Iran with arms
and new missile technology, realizing the missiles might eventually be capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead. Israel’s sale of arms to Iran continued even after the Islamic
revolution, while Ayatollah Khomeini continued to call for Israel’s destruction.
The fundamentalist revolution in Iran left them with a weakened military. They
needed spare parts for the air and ground weapons they had purchased from the United
States by the shah when they went to war with Iraq in 1980. Because of the US arms
embargo following the hostage crisis, Iran turned to its former ally who was willing to
sell it US parts and weapons, including missiles. It was good business; besides, Israel
wanted its hostages released and also feared Iraq more than Iran. There were also US
hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. After giving Israel a wink and nod approval to
sell some of their stockpile of US weapons and missiles to Iran, the United States got
conned into dealing with Iran directly, hoping to get the remaining hostages released. The
Reagan administration, ignoring their own US arms embargo on sales to Iran, sold arms
to them directly, leading to the Iran/Contra scandal.
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Following the Gulf War in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, conditions
were promising for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Peace with the Palestinians
was perceived as a threat by the Israeli right who wanted time for more settlement
expansion toward a “Greater Israel” with the Jordan River as its eastern border. Iran also
felt threatened by peace between Israel and the Palestinians, as peace would damage their
relationship with Syria; hence Hezbollah and Iran’s vision of a Shia revival. Yitzhak
Rabin lost his life after signing the Oslo Peace Agreement that would have confined
Israel to the pre-1967 borders via some land swaps. This agreement infuriated the Israeli
conservatives, as further expansion would be restricted.
Iran was humiliated by not being asked to participate in the Madrid or Oslo peace
processes in the early 1990s when all other countries in the region were asked to be
involved. Iran began supporting Oslo opponents: Hezbollah, then Hamas. With the
demise of the Soviet Union, there was no longer a common enemy to keep the United
States fully committed to Israel. A new common enemy was needed. Iran became the
logical choice. The Israeli-Iranian alliance was turned upside down and became
adversarial. Now Israel had to convince their most important backer, the United States,
that Iran had become an irrational terrorist state. It was up to AIPAC to persuade
Washington.
Iran continues to pursue its nuclear enrichment program and perhaps a nuclear
weapon, while Israel threatens to attack, potentially plunking the United States in the
middle of another war. The powerful Israeli lobby in the United States supports Israel’s
right to exist as they always have, and continues to support the Netanyahu government
even though many in AIPAC disagree with expanded settlements in the West Bank.
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Israel’s existence was initially enabled by the Jewish lobby pressuring President Truman
to support the UN decision for partition in 1947, and Israel continues to exist as a nation
today largely because of AIPAC’s commitment to sustain US support.
As Mossad spymaster Meir Dagon argued in a recent Sixty Minutes interview,
“The ‘unintended consequences’ of bombing Iran and starting another war makes no
sense at this time as there is still time for negotiations and sanctions to work.”2 The
Iranian regime is not irrational and the Iranian people, he argues, covet and respect peace
and a chance to move toward democracy but resist being told what they must do;
however, they are not yet in control of their own destiny.
Sheera Frenkel, writing for McClatchy Newspapers, recently reported that Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “had ordered a heightened military alert during a
meeting in late 2010.” The report described the country’s top military and intelligence
leaders, Israel Defense Forces chief Gabi Ashkenazi, and the director of the Mossad spy
agency, Meir Dagan, as shocked by Netanyahu’s move; both argued strongly against the
measure. Dagan argued that placing the military on such a heightened alert could lead to
an illegal decision to go to war. “That is not something you do unless you are certain you
want to use it at the end,” Ashkenazi concurred. Both Dagan and Ashkenazi have been
replaced.3
New York Times columnist Tom Friedman’s recent commentary “Hagel’s views
on Israel make him a good pick [for secretary of Defense],” reprinted in the Idaho
Statesman December 29, 2012, argues that Hagel as a US senator “bluntly stated that his
job was not to take orders from the Israel lobby but to advance US interests.” Friedman
goes on, “if ever [there was a time] Israel needed a US defense secretary who was
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committed to Israel’s survival as Hagel has repeatedly stated—but who was convinced
that survival didn’t mean having America go along with Israel’s lunatic, self-destructive
drift into settling the West Bank and obviating a two-state solution—it is now. Most US
senators, policymakers, and Jews prefer to stick their heads into the sand because
confronting Israel is so politically dangerous; at least Hagel cares enough about Israel to
be an exception.”4
Ben Stein eloquently summarized the Jewish position in a recent CBS Sunday
Morning commentary, arguing that half the Jews in the world were wiped out by the
Holocaust in Europe only two generations ago so the Jews know “the absolute worst that
can be imagined CAN happen. It is fine to urge patience on Israel, to assure Israel that
sanctions ‘maybe’ will work.” Stein argues that “Israeli Jews, the children and
grandchildren of the wretched survivors of the Holocaust, cannot accept ‘maybe’; if they
are to be saved, they have to save themselves.”5 Hopefully there is more time for the
sanctions on Iran to work, in order to avoid another destructive Middle East war that
would have devastating consequences.
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